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[W]here the market has very limited purchasing power, as is the case for 
diseases affecting millions of poor people in developing countries, patents 
are not a relevant factor or effective in stimulating [Research and 
Development] and bringing new products to market.2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The debate surrounding the creation of a balanced patent 
protection regime in countries is not new. For decades, policy makers 
experimented with the levels of protection.3 For example, the 
Netherlands abolished patents in the field of chemistry for decades 
between 1869 and 1910, in order to catch up with other European 
countries such as Germany.4 Similarly, between 1960 and 1980 a 
number of Asian economies—often referred to as the Tiger 
economies—adopted a systematic national policy of reverse 
engineering and imitation.5 When South Korea introduced patent 
protection in 1961, the protection term was limited to only twelve 
years and protection did not extend to foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals, or 
 
 2.  WORLD HEALTH ORG., PUBLIC HEALTH INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH 22 (2006) [hereinafter WHO, PUBLIC 
HEALTH INNOVATION]. 
 3.  On the history of the weak regime for intellectual property protection in 
the United States, see Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the Twenty-
First Century: Will the Developing Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 
1115, 1116-18, 1120 (2009).   
 4.  ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: 
HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND 
PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 86-90 (2004). 
 5.  See COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 20 (2002) (finding 
that East Asian countries, Taiwan and South Korea in particular, imposed weak 
patent systems to expand technical knowledge and foster rapid economic 
development). 
  
2016] TRIPS-PLUS 375 
chemicals.6 Similarly, many of the developed nations adopted a 
relaxed protection regime during their initial stages of development, 
utilizing their preferred intellectual property regime only after 
reaching a certain level of advancement.7 
This debate remains as relevant as ever.8 A 2013 report published 
in Australia sums up the dilemma facing many governments in the 
area of public health, noting: 
Thus the question of how much patent protection to offer is crucial. 
Pharmaceutical patent rights that run for too long or that are defined too 
expansively will deprive people of drugs because purchasers, including 
Governments, cannot afford them. They can also constrain follow on 
innovation: too weak a patent system means patients will suffer because 
the industry has inadequate incentives to develop new drugs.9 
On March 31, 2015, the Harper Report, triggered by major 
concerns about the current regime, requested that the Australian 
government should direct the Productivity Commission to conduct a 
twelve-month overarching review of the intellectual property regime 
in the country.10 
 
 6.  See id. at 19-20 (conveying the prevalent belief at the time that states had 
to restrict patents on “essential goods” such as food, medicine, and basic 
chemicals; the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
prohibits such discriminatory policies today). 
 7.  See CTR. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES & DEBATES, BRAZIL’S PATENT REFORM 
INNOVATION TOWARDS NATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 224, 225 (2013) (citing Ha-
Joon Chang who implied that many developed countries mistakenly believe that 
stronger intellectual property protection led to their economic growth). 
 8.  There has been a number of reports in recent years of this type including a 
report by the Government of the United Kingdom. See COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL 
PROP. RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 155 (weighing arguments for and against stronger 
intellectual property rights and deciding that intellectual property rights should be 
customized to meet the economic and social needs of the developing country in 
question); see also GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 59 (2006) 
(finding that flexibility to choose the strength of intellectual rights is necessary for 
developing countries).  
 9.  TONY HARRIS ET AL., PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS REVIEW REPORT v 
(2013). 
 10.  IAN HARPER ET AL., COMPETITION POLICY REVIEW FINAL REPORT 41 
(2015); cf. GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra note 8, at 1 
(stating that the United Kingdom commissioned a similar report examining 
whether its intellectual property regime was meeting its “purpose in an era of 
globalisation, digitisation, and increasing economic specialisation”). 
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Many factors affect the intellectual property regime in any 
country.11 This also means that the responsiveness of intellectual 
property protection itself to any reform will vary depending on these 
factors. Therefore, it is baseless to advocate that stronger economic 
growth in any given country would be triggered by strengthened 
intellectual property protection.12 The World Bank, in a 2005 report, 
concluded that “[e]vidence is inconclusive about the responsiveness 
of Foreign Direct Investment (“FDI”) to intellectual property 
regimes.”13 
Home grown factors, including a country’s level of development 
and progress, its national priorities, and standards of living are often 
important factors in shaping the debate. Yet in more recent times, 
external factors became more visible—and even more influential to 
that effect—in the formation of such a process. Following the 
creation of the World Trade Organisation (“WTO”) and its 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(“TRIPS Agreement”) in 1994, an upward trend in the regulation and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights in general was 
noticeable.14 More recently, TRIPS-Plus rules were included under 
various bilateral, regional, and multilateral arrangements and forums 
resulting in strengthened levels of intellectual property protection 
and enforcement in many parts of the world.15 
 
 11.  See Carlos Correa, Designing Patent Policies Suited to Developing 
Countries Needs, 10 ECONÔMICA, RIO DE JANEIRO 82, 87 (2008) (discussing, 
among other things, growing limitations on a developing country’s ability to shape 
their patent system because of TRIPS-Plus provisions in Free Trade Agreements 
such as expanding patents to protect “the second indication of existing 
medicines”). 
 12.  See generally Fritz Malchup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in 
the Nineteenth Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1 (1950) (presenting how the nineteenth 
century arguments for and against patent protections remained unchanged despite 
economic changes during that time period). 
 13.  WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS: TRADE, REGIONALISM, 
AND DEVELOPMENT 110 (2005).  
 14.  See Ruth L. Okediji, Legal Innovation in International Intellectual 
Property Relations: Revisiting Twenty-One Years of the TRIPS Agreement, 36 U. 
PA. J. INT’L L. 191, 205 (2014) (“Certainly, the TRIPS Agreement has not 
produced the normative stability many imagined, desired or feared.”).  
 15.  Wadhwa recently explained the developments and change of approach in 
following manner:   
The framers of the U.S. Constitution were not wrong. Patents did serve an important 
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More crucial than any other branch of intellectual property in 
today’s global debate is the issue of patent protection and its relation 
to the accessibility and affordability of medicines. The TRIPS 
Agreement made it obligatory for the first time in history for all 
member states to provide patent protection for pharmaceutical 
products and processes.16 This meant that many developing—and 
developed—countries are no longer capable of making drugs cheaper 
and affordable for their citizens, due to the need to pay royalties to 
the pharmaceutical producers originating from the developed 
countries.17 With the support of the major pharmaceutical producers, 
these developed countries incorporated the protection of intellectual 
property in their international trade agenda under the auspices of free 
trade, resulting in, and subjecting developing countries into 
accepting, higher TRIPS-Plus levels of intellectual property 
protection under their national legal regimes.18 
 
 
centuries. In today’s era of exponentially advancing technologies, however, patents 
have become the greatest inhibitor to innovation and are holding the United States 
back. The only way of staying ahead is to out-innovate a competitor; speed to market 
and constant reinvention are critical. Patents do the reverse; they create disincentives 
to innovate and slow down innovators by allowing technology laggards and 
extortionists to sue them. 
Vivek Wadhwa, Here’s Why Patents are Innovation’s Worst Enemy, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 11, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2015/ 
03/11/heres-why-patents-are-innovations-worst-enemy/.  
 16.  Essential Medicines and Health Products, WTO and the TRIPS Agreement, 
WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/wto_trips/en/# 
(last visited Jan. 26, 2016). 
 17.  See John H. Barton, TRIPS and the Global Pharmaceutical Market, 23 
HEALTH AFF., May-June 2004, at 146, 146-48 (noting that India possessed an 
established industry in generic drugs that became threatened by the patent 
provisions in the TRIPS Agreement). 
 18.  See CAROLYN DEERE, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: THE TRIPS 
AGREEMENT AND THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORM IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 13 (2008) (“Over a third of the WTO’s 106 developing 
country members included a broad range of TRIPS-plus provisions in their laws. 
Over half of the countries in this TRIPS-plus group were [least developed 
countries]—the same countries that the economic literature anticipates would 
adopt the lowest levels of IP protection.”); Courtenay Atwell, Corporate 
Involvement in Intellectual Property Policy-making, 36 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 
306, 308 (2014) (examining the history of corporate involvement in intellectual 
property protections in the United States in the years leading up to the TRIPS 
Agreement). 
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Significantly, many countries—including developed ones—are no 
longer able to cater and provide adequate public health care coverage 
for their citizens due to the high costs of medicines. The situation is 
worsened due to various austerity measures taken by many of these 
countries.19 
In the light of the above, this article will provide an overview of 
the current global debate with relation to public health and access to 
medicines and its relationship with patent policy. It will also touch 
upon the flexibilities of the TRIPS Agreement and provide various 
utilization examples where such flexibilities have resulted in a 
positive impact on access to medicines and public health in both 
developed and developing countries. Although there has been 
extensive discussion in recent years focusing on the importance of 
incorporating the TRIPS Agreement’s flexibilities under national 
law, there has been little discussion about the options available to 
those countries that have already committed themselves to TRIPS-
Plus obligations. Taking this into consideration, this article will 
provide an overview of various examples whereby countries 
managed to limit the negative impact of TRIPS-Plus rules under their 
national legal regime through legal and institutional innovative 
approaches. Finally, this article will also allude to the global debate 
related to financing of public health care and will explore the 
viability of one supplementary scheme which could complement the 
patent protection regime in this regard, namely pay-for-performance 
schemes. 
II. PUBLIC HEALTH, PHARMACEUTICAL 
INNOVATION, AND THE COMPETITIVENESS OF 
THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
The global public health situation is facing many challenges today. 
One third of the world’s population (over 2 billion people) does not 
have regular access to basic, essential medicine.20 Of the 34 million 
 
 19.  See, e.g., Helena Smith et al., Greek Economy Close to Collapse as Food 
and Medicine Run Short, GUARDIAN (July 3, 2015), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/03/greece-economy-collapse-close-
food-medicine-shortage.  
 20.  See Hans V. Hogerzeil & Zafar Mirza, WORLD HEALTH ORG. [WHO], THE 
WORLD MEDICINES SITUATION 2011: ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES AS PART 
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people estimated by the World Health Organization (“WHO”), the 
Children’s Rights and Emergency Relief Organization, and the Joint 
United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS to be living with the 
human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”) and who should have been 
receiving treatment, only 8 million had access to treatment by the 
end of 2011.21 As of June 2014, 13.6 million people living with HIV 
had access to antiretroviral therapy and 41% of all adults living with 
HIV are receiving treatment.22 However, just 32% of all children 
living with HIV are receiving the lifesaving medicines.23 The burden 
of the “neglected disease” or “diseases of the poor” overcasts its 
shadow over this situation leaving the world helpless in saving many 
lives all over the globe.24 
On the other hand, the pharmaceutical industry has been engulfed 
with its own woes in recent years culminating in a number of 
challenges. The first major challenge is the investment and research 
(“R&D”) dilemma facing the industry. Drug producers are no 
different than other investors in that their operations are motivated by 
profits. The fact that their mission implies saving lives, does not 
speak to whether this mission would be achieved at cost to these 
companies and their shareholders.25 The first important element for 
any pharmaceutical company’s decision to indulge in specific 
experiments and clinical trials is market size and more importantly 
the ability of that market size (i.e. patients) to be able to purchase the 
 
OF THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 1 (2011).  
 21.  UNAIDS, GLOBAL REPORT: UNAIDS REPORT ON THE GLOBAL AIDS 
EPIDEMIC 8, 50 (2012).  
 22.  Fact Sheet 2015, UNAIDS (2015), http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/ 
campaigns/HowAIDSchangedeverything/factsheet. 
 23.  Id.  
 24.  See Getting to Zero AIDS-Related Deaths: TRIPS and the Potential Impact 
of Free Trade Agreements, UNAIDS (June 1, 2012), http://www.unaids.org/en/ 
resources/presscentre/featurestories/2012/june/20120601tripsftas (explaining the 
impact of TRIPS-Plus provisions on the dire circumstances of millions of people 
on antiretroviral therapy). 
 25.  Michael Pearson, the CEO of Valeant Pharmaceuticals stated recently that 
“[i]f products are sort of mispriced and there’s an opportunity, we will act 
appropriately in terms of doing what I assume our shareholders would like us to 
do.” James Woods, Pharma CEO: We’re in Business of Shareholder Profit, Not 
Helping the Sick, US Uncut (Oct. 9, 2015), http://usuncut.com/class-war/valeant-
ceo-shareholder-profit/.   
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drug at the asking price.26 Due to such externalities, this resulted in 
the well-known equation; the ninety-ten gap. The Commission on 
Health Research for Development explained in a 1990 report that 
90% of the innovation in healthcare relates to the diseases of a mere 
10% of the population of the world.27 This explains why the 
pharmaceutical industry remains today as one of the most profitable 
industries around the globe. Strikingly, in 2013, there were five 
pharmaceutical companies which each made a profit margin of 20% 
or more—Pfizer, Hoffmann-La Roche, AbbVie, GlaxoSmithKline, 
and Eli Lilly.28 Avorn further explains: 
In terms of access to capital, it’s interesting to note that large drug makers 
are among the U.S. firms with the highest amounts of profits held 
overseas. Two pharmaceutical companies are ranked third and fourth 
among all U.S. corporations in this regard: Pfizer ($69 billion) and Merck 
($57 billion), respectively. Collectively, another eight drug companies 
reportedly have an additional $173 billion of capital that is retained 
overseas, untaxed by the United States.29 
Accordingly, multinational pharmaceutical companies are more 
interested in how activities relate to certain types of diseases, i.e. 
lifestyle diseases (including skin care and sexual dysfunctional 
related disease) to that of neglected diseases (including malaria, 
 
 26.  See Ernst R. Berndt et al., Decline in Economic Returns from New Drugs 
Raises Questions About Sustaining Innovations, 34 HEALTH AFF. 245, 245 (2015) 
(finding that pharmaceutical companies assessed whether their “life-time sales 
[would] be sufficient to generate positive returns on investment beyond recouping 
[research and development] and operating costs”). 
 27.  COMM’N ON HEALTH RESEARCH FOR DEV., HEALTH RESEARCH: 
ESSENTIAL LINK TO EQUITY IN DEVELOPMENT 4, 45 (1990); see SOPHIE BLOEMEN 
ET AL., OXFAM, TRADING AWAY ACCESS TO MEDICINES—REVISITED: HOW THE 
EUROPEAN TRADE AGENDA CONTINUES TO UNDERMINE ACCESS TO MEDICINES 8 
(2014) (“The statistical finding that only 10 percent of the world’s R&D 
expenditure for health is devoted to diseases that primarily affect the poorest 90 
percent of the global population has become a symbol of the current R&D crisis.”). 
 28.  Richard Anderson, Pharmaceutical Industry Gets High on Fat Profits, 
BBC News (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-28212223 
[hereinafter Anderson, Fat Profits] (“Last year, US giant Pfizer, the world’s largest 
drug company by pharmaceutical revenue, made an eye-watering 42% profit 
margin. As one industry veteran understandably says: ‘I wouldn’t be able to justify 
[those kinds of margins].’”).   
 29.  Jerry Avorn, The $2.6 Billion Pill – Methodologic and Policy 
Considerations, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1877, 1878 (2015).  
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tuberculosis, and even antibiotics).30 In fact, some studies indicate 
that neglected diseases (even including type II diseases, such as 
malaria and tuberculosis) receive a meagre 2% of the annual $160 
billion spent globally on R&D.31 This example is quite similar to the 
recent Ebola outbreak where no vaccination existed despite the fact 
that the disease has been around for decades with more than thirty 
outbreaks.32 One commentator recently described the full picture by 
stating that “[o]ur priorities are tilted by marketplace imperatives.”33 
In a widely circulated publication dating to 2002, Trouiller et al. 
found that of all of the pharmaceutical products developed in the 
world between 1975 and 1999, only 1.1% were related to neglected 
diseases.34 Recently, the same study was repeated and the results 
 
 30.  MATTHIAS BUENTE ET AL., BOOZ & CO., PHARMA EMERGING MARKETS 
2.0: HOW EMERGING MARKETS ARE DRIVING THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 8 (2013) (finding that pharmaceutical executives 
believe that “disease patterns in emerging markets are rapidly changing and 
shifting toward ‘lifestyle’ diseases”). For instance, there have been no new 
discoveries of distinct classes of antibacterials since 1987. Michael Torrice, 
Antibacterial Boom and Bust, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Sept. 9, 2013, at 
34, 36. The lack of investment in research and development on the “diseases of the 
poor” prompted the WHO to adopt the Global Strategy and Plan of Action on 
Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property in 2008. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 
[WHO], GLOBAL STRATEGY AND PLAN OF ACTION ON PUBLIC HEALTH, 
INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011). 
 31.  Brian Till, How Drug Companies Keep Medicine Out of Reach, ATLANTIC 
(May 15, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/05/how-drug-
companies-keep-medicine-out-of-reach/275853/.  
 32.  See Abraar Karan & Thomas Pogge, Ebola and the Need for Restructuring 
Pharmaceutical Incentives, 5 J. GLOBAL HEALTH 1, 1-2 (2015) (“Had there been 
significant Ebola outbreaks in affluent nations rather than in Sub-Saharan Africa in 
the past few decades, we would likely have an arsenal of medications in stock 
today. While pharmaceutical companies continue to profit from sales of non-
essential medicines, and neglect investments in medicines that are needed mainly 
by the poor, the global community ends up paying as result.”).  
 33.  Till, supra note 31 (quoting Bill Gates explaining that “[t]he malaria 
vaccine, in humanist terms, is the biggest need, but it gets virtually no funding. If 
you are working on male baldness or the other things you get an order of 
magnitude more researching funding because of the voice in the marketplace”).  
 34.  See Patrice Trouiller et al., Drug Development for Neglected Diseases: A 
Deficient Market and a Public-Health Policy Failure, 359 LANCET 2188, 2188 
(2002) (finding that sixteen out of 1,393 drugs marketed between 1975 and 1999 
were for neglected diseases). 
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only marginally changed.35 Of the 850 products brought to market 
around the world between 2000 and 2011, the study found that only 
4% (a mere thirty-seven) were related to neglected diseases, which 
mainly exist in least and middle income countries and include 
malaria, tuberculosis, Chagas’ disease, leishmaniasis, and diarrhoeal 
diseases.36 
A more in-depth analysis of the fields and areas where the R&D 
activities are conducted also assists in explaining the selectiveness of 
the industry. One study found that “[a]mong the 1223 new chemical 
entities commercialized between 1975 to 1997, . . . only 13 (1%) are 
specifically for tropical diseases. . . . and only 4 (0.3%) may be 
considered direct results of R&D activities of the pharmaceutical 
industry.”37 A more recent study found that pharmaceutical 
companies conduct thirty times more clinical trials for recurrent 
cancer drugs than for preventive drugs.38 The study showed that 
pharmaceutical companies focus more on profitable recurring sales 
through diverting their R&D expenditures away from more curable, 
localized cancers and focus on incurable metastatic and recurrent 
cancers instead.39 As the authors of the study explain, “the patent 
system encourages pharmaceuticals to pump out drugs aimed at 
 
 35.  See Miltos Ladikas & Sachin Chaturvedi, The Health Impact Fund, Issues 
and Challenges, in THE LIVING TREE: TRADITIONAL MEDICINE AND PUBLIC 
HEALTH IN CHINA AND INDIA 33, 33 (Sachin Chaturvedi et al. eds., 2014) (“Of the 
1,556 new drugs approved for commercial sale from 1975-2004, only 18 (ca 1%) 
were for neglected tropical diseases.”).   
 36.  Germán Velásquez, Guidelines on Patentability and Access to Medicines 8 
(South Ctr., Working Paper No. 61, 2015); see also Carlos Correa, Guidelines for 
the Examination of Pharmaceutical Patents: Developing a Public Health 
Perspective vii (Jan. 2007) (working paper) (on file with the World Health 
Organization and International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development) 
[hereinafter Correa, Guidelines] (suggesting that treatments to diseases such as 
AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, bacterial meningitis, and pneumonia will require 
ongoing research and development to combat increasing resistance to the existing 
medicine).  
 37.  Bernard Pécoul et al., Access to Essential Drugs in Poor Countries: A Lost 
Battle?, 281 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 361, 364 (1999). 
 38.  See Eric Budish et al., Do Firms Underinvest in Long-Term Research? 
Evidence from Cancer Clinical Trials, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2044, 2047 (2015) 
(discovering that firms conducted 17,000 clinical trials for recurrent cancer 
treatment versus less than 500 trials toward prevention). 
 39.  A.T., Patents That Kill, ECONOMIST (Aug. 8, 2014, 9:50 AM), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2014/08/innovation. 
  
2016] TRIPS-PLUS 383 
those who have almost no chance of surviving the cancer anyway. 
This patent distortion costs the U.S. economy around $89 billion a 
year in lost lives.”40 
Notably, the selectiveness in the development of new medicines 
also applies to industrialised countries including the United States. 
For instance, Zakir Thomas reminds us that “the United States is the 
largest pharmaceutical market of the world. Even there, if you have a 
disease which does not command a huge market which interests 
pharmaceutical companies, you don’t have innovation.”41 
The stagnation—which some would even argue the decline—in 
the innovative and productive ability of pharmaceutical companies in 
recent years is visible.42 The situation is also exacerbated by the 
disequilibrium with relation to the breakdown of R&D activities and 
the focus on the disease related to the minority citizens of the globe 
who are rich enough to be able to cover the cost of their 
medication.43 A 2006 U.S. Government Accountability Office report 
stated: 
[O]ver the past several years it has become widely recognized throughout 
the industry that the productivity of its research and development 
expenditures has been declining; that is, the number of new drugs being 
produced has generally declined while research and development 
expenses have been steadily increasing. Similarly, FDA and analysts 
reported that pharmaceutical research and development investments were 
not producing the expected results and that innovation in the 
pharmaceutical industry had become stagnant.44 
 
 40.  Id.  
 41.  Zakir Thomas, The Limits of the Patent System Do Patents Kill 
Innovation?, OPEN SOURCE DRUG DISCOVERY (Aug. 13, 2014), 
http://osddbengaluru.net/osdd/?p=16504. 
 42.  See Cynthia M. Ho, Should All Drugs Be Patentable?: A Comparative 
Perspective, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 295, 300 (2015) (indicating that some 
academics believe stronger patent protection is necessary to expand research and 
development into innovating new drugs); see also Berndt et al., supra note 26, at 
250-51 (asserting that protective intellectual property rights are meant to encourage 
R&D, but evidence shows that new active substances are not producing a 
significant economic return).  
 43.  COMM’N ON MACROECONOMICS & HEALTH, MACROECONOMICS AND 
HEALTH: INVESTING IN HEALTH FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 78 (2001). 
 44.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-49, NEW DRUG 
DEVELOPMENT: SCIENCE, BUSINESS, REGULATORY, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
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More recently Kees de Joncheere stated that, “[t]he system has 
served us well in terms of developing good new medicines, but in the 
past 10-20 years there has been very little breakthrough in 
innovation.”45 The situation is no different on the opposite side of the 
Atlantic. In 2008, the European Commission reported a decrease in 
new chemical entities registered between 1990 and 2007 (from fifty-
one in 1991 to twenty-one in 2007).46 
A look at available data would assist in explaining the above 
further. On average and with the exception of the year 2014—when a 
record forty-one new drugs were approved representing the highest 
increase in eighteen years—a dramatic decline of newly-developed 
chemical entities has been observed during the last fifteen years.47 
This positions the industry uniquely as the range of its innovation 
fluctuates between major “blockbuster” breakthroughs to minor 
“trivial” improvements and new uses of available medicines.48 
Unsurprisingly, it is within the latter category where the majority of 
 
ISSUES CITED AS HAMPERING DRUG DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS 2 (2006). Moreover, a 
PricewaterhouseCoopers report revealed that despite increased expenditures on 
R&D, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration authorized a mere twenty-two new 
molecular entities in 2006. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, PHARMA 2020: THE 
VISION: WHICH PATH WILL YOU TAKE? 5 (2007). 
 45.  Richard Anderson, Pharmaceuticals Industry Facing Fundamental 
Change, BBC NEWS (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-
29659537 [hereinafter Anderson, Pharmaceuticals].  
 46.  EUR. COMM’N, PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR INQUIRY, FINAL REPORT 38 
(2009) [hereinafter EUR. COMM’N, PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR INQUIRY].  
 47.  Cambria Alpha-Cobb & Anthony D. Sabatelli, Guest Post: 41 New Drugs 
Approved in ‘14 – A Random Spike or a Growing Trend of Drug Innovation?, 
PATENT DOCS (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.patentdocs.org/2015/01/guest-post-41-
new-drugs-approved-in-14-a-random-spike-or-a-growing-trend-of-drug-
innovation.html; see Jeff Cohen et al., Strategic Alternatives in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry 5 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Kellogg School of 
Management) (“In fact, R&D productivity for the pharmaceutical industry has 
declined considerably with the number of New Molecular Entities (NMEs) 
submitted for approval dropping by nearly 50 percent, to about 40, and the number 
of New Chemical Entities (NCEs) produced per company declining by 41 
percent . . . .”). 
 48.  See Cohen et al., supra note 47, at 8-10 (reflecting the dilemma 
pharmaceutical companies face with the decline of innovative drugs. The companies 
cannot rely on the substantial returns they generated from “blockbuster drugs” if they 
want to appease their shareholders. Instead, they generate new sources of revenue by 
making slight improvements to existing drugs). 
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recent innovations—or more accurately improvements—have taken 
place.49 
The statistics referred to above, however, do not explain the full 
story. The issue with the new entrant drugs into the market is that 
they actually represent “minor” or “combinational” improvements 
rather than breakthrough or substantial discoveries.50 Indeed, as 
Youn et al. eloquently explains: 
By definition, all patented inventions are ‘novel’, but not all novelty is 
created equal. The novelty instantiated by patented inventions stems not 
only from conceiving new technologies but also from combining 
technologies, either new or old. The history of US patents reveals a slight 
preponderance of technological combinations not previously seen in the 
patent record. US patent law, however, allows for patents to be granted to 
inventions that represent improvements over existing inventions.51 
For example, a 2005 survey published in France found that 68% of 
the 3096 new products approved in the country between 1981 and 
2004 brought “nothing new” in comparison to previous 
preparations.52 Another study concluded  that almost  half of the new 
 
 49.  See id.; see also Carlos M. Correa, Pharmaceutical Innovation, 
Incremental Patenting and Compulsory Licensing 5 (South Ctr., Research Paper 
No. 41, 2011) [hereinafter Correa, Pharmaceutical Innovation] (“The fall in 
innovative productivity may indicate a crisis in the model of drug development 
carried out by large pharmaceutical companies, as ‘the number of new products 
has not increased whilst the overall level of resources being invested has risen 
dramatically.’”). 
 50.  See Cohen et al., supra note 47, at 8-10; see also WHO, PUBLIC HEALTH 
INNOVATION, supra note 2, at 131 (“[T]here are studies which find that many new 
medicines offer little or no improvement over existing medicines. For instance, in a 
recent Canadian study, the conclusion was that in British Columbia, 80% of the 
increase in drug expenditure between 1996 and 2003 was explained by the use of 
new, patented drugs that did not offer substantial improvements over less 
expensive alternatives available before 1990.”). 
 51.  Hyejin Youn et al., Invention as a Combinatorial Process: Evidence from 
US Patents, J. ROYAL SOC. INTERFACE, no. 106, 2015, at 7. The Economist further 
elaborates that “invention now proceeds mainly by recombining existing 
technologies and chimes with the idea that inventions were, in some sense, more 
fundamental in the past than they are today.” The Process of Invention, Now and 
Then, ECONOMIST (Apr. 25, 2015), http://www.economist.com/node/21649448/ 
print. 
 52.  A Review of New Drugs in 2004: Floundering Innovation and Increased 
Risk-Taking, 14 PRESCRIRE INT’L 68, 71 (2005). See generally K.I. Kaitin & J.A. 
DiMasi, Pharmaceutical Innovation in the 21st Century: New Drug Approvals in 
  
386 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [31:3 
drugs approved for use during the 1990s in the United States did not 
offer major or important clinical improvements.53 A Canadian study 
of 1,147 newly patented drugs, including derivatives of existing 
medicines between 1990 and 2003, revealed that 1005 of such drugs 
did not provide a “substantial improvement over existing drug 
products.”54 Although as mentioned, the year 2014 witnessed an 
increase in the number of approved New Molecular Entities, it 
remains to be an exception than the rule.55 
Interestingly, accompanying the same trend was the substantial 
increase in the number of granted pharmaceutical patents, which 
represented mostly minor and simple improvements in chemistry/
formulation of existing pharmaceutical products (e.g. polymorphs, 
combinations, dosage forms, isomers) or incremental modifications 
of existing drugs (e.g. a different dosage or a different form of 
administration).56 Correa explains that “[t]housands of patents are 
granted per year on these incremental innovations, often trivial for a 
person skilled in pharmaceutical research and production.”57 Such a 
phenomenon is not confined to the United States. A 1994 Canadian 
study found that 90% of all patented inventions were minor 
improvements on existing patented devices.58 As Ho explains: 
Accordingly, a rational profit-maximizing company would logically seek 
to focus on incremental inventions. In fact, that is already the case. During 
the 1990s more than half of applications for “new” drugs were 
incremental innovations that utilized known active ingredients. In 
addition, studies of pharmaceutical innovation in the United States, 
Australia, and Europe all found most new drugs were incremental 
innovations and that only between 10 and 30 percent of drugs were more 
 
the First Decade, 2000–2009, 89 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 183 
(2011). 
 53.  MICHAEL BAILEY ET AL., POLICY DEP’T OF OXFAM, FATAL SIDE EFFECTS: 
MEDICINE PATENTS UNDER THE MICROSCOPE 26 (2001). 
 54.  Steven G Morgan et al., “Breakthrough” Drugs and Growth in 
Expenditure on Prescription Drugs in Canada, 331 BMJ 815, 815 (2005).  
 55.  Alpha-Cobb & Sabatelli, supra note 47. 
 56.  Correa, Pharmaceutical Innovation, supra note 49, at 4; see also Ho, supra 
note 42, at 311 (“Although an incremental modification may be of some clinical 
benefit, these are notably easier and less expensive to develop; one estimate 
suggests that the cost of development is only a quarter of the cost of the most 
expensive drugs (based on new molecular entities).”).  
 57.  Correa, Pharmaceutical Innovation, supra note 49, at 4. 
 58.  Id. at 2 (citing the Guide of the Canadian Intellectual Property Office).  
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therapeutically valuable than existing drugs.59 
The prices of new medicines are also on the rise, making them out 
of the reach of the majority of citizens even in developed countries.60 
For instance, many new cancer treatments are biologic drugs priced 
at more than $100,000 per year.61 Bristol-Myer’s new drug for 
advanced melanoma, nivolumab (trade name Opdivo), can cost from 
$2,500 to $3,700 per week, depending upon the patient weight. So 
explains, “11 of the 12 cancer drugs approved in 2012 were priced 
over US$100,000 per patient per year.”62 So concludes  that among 
the top 100 drugs in the United States, “the median revenue per 
patient rose from US$1,258 in 2010 to US$9,396 in 2014.”63 A new 
hepatitis C treatment (sofosbuvir, marketed as Sovaldi) recently 
came onto the market at the high price of $84,000 for a twelve-week 
treatment.64 This drug, when used in conjunction with another drug, 
 
 59.  Ho, supra note 42, at 312; see also Michael Lanthier et al., An Improved 
Approach to Measuring Drug Innovation Finds Steady Rates of First-In-Class 
Pharmaceuticals, 1987-2011, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1433, 1435-36 (2013) (supporting 
the view that the sudden increase in new drug approvals during the 1990s were not 
a result of innovative new drugs, but of incremental innovations). 
 60.  Jan Schakowsky & Peter Maybarduk, US Trade Policy Could Raise Drug 
Prices, at Home and Abroad, HILL (Mar. 6, 2015), http://thehill.com/opinion/op-
ed/234801-us-trade-policy-could-raise-drug-prices-at-home-and-abroad. Even the 
price of some old medicines have been increasing as in the case of multiple 
sclerosis drugs. The first generation of these drugs which entered the market in the 
1990s had prices ranging between $8,000 to $11,000 a year. Despite having new 
drugs entering the market, one drug that initially cost $8,700 now costs $62,000 a 
year. In September 2015, the New York Times reported that the price of the drug 
(Daraprim), which was acquired in August by Turing Pharmaceuticals, was raised 
to $750 a tablet from $13.50, bringing the annual cost of treatment for some 
patients to hundreds of thousands of dollars. Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes from 
$13.50 a Tablet to $750, Overnight, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/a-huge-overnight-increase-in-a-
drugs-price-raises-protests.html?_r=1.  
 61.  Schakowsky & Maybarduk, supra note 60. 
 62.  Catherine Saez, At WTO, Experts Discuss Solutions To Drugs Innovation 
Crisis; IP Not In The List, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.ip-
watch.org/2014/10/03/at-wto-experts-discuss-solutions-to-drugs-innovation-crisis-
ip-not-in-the-list/ (referencing the assertions of Anthony So, director of the 
Program on Global Health and Technology Access at the Duke University Sanford 
School of Public Policy). 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Andrew Pollack, High Cost of Sovaldi Hepatitis C Drug Prompts a Call to 
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can have a positive result of curing most cases of hepatitis C in 
twelve weeks with few side effects.65 Such prices make this drug 
largely unattainable by many citizens in developed countries 
including Australia and Spain particularly for the latter where an 
estimated 800,000 people infected with hepatitis C live.66 Anderson 
 
Void Its Patents, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/ 
20/business/high-cost-of-hepatitis-c-drug-prompts-a-call-to-void-its-patents.html 
?_r=0 [hereinafter Pollack, High Cost]. Another drug, harvoni, a prescription 
medicine containing ledipasvir and sofosbuvir, used to treat chronic hepatitis C 
infection in adults costs $95,000 for a course of treatment. Only Just the Beginning 
of the End of Hepatitis C, 383 LANCET 281, 281 (2014); Susan Abram, Hepatitis C 
Drugs Sovaldi and Harvoni Out of Reach for Most, Except Inmates, L.A. DAILY 
NEWS (Oct. 26, 2015), http://www.dailynews.com/health/20151026/hepatitis-c-
drugs-sovaldi-and-harvoni-out-of-reach-for-most-except-inmates&template= 
printart; Philippe Douste-Blazy, Hepatitis C Medicines Must Be Made Accessible 
Faster Than HIV Drugs Were, GUARDIAN (Mar. 7, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2014/mar/07/ 
hepatitis-c-medicines-hiv-aids-drugs; Gilead’s Harvoni and Sovaldi Demonstrate 
Efficacy and Safety Among Chronic Hepatitis C Patients with Advanced Liver 
Disease, GILEAD (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.gilead.com/news/press-
releases/2015/4/gileads-harvoni-and-sovaldi-demonstrate-efficacy-and-safety-
among-chronic-hepatitis-c-patients-with-advanced-liver-disease. Today’s hepatitis 
C epidemic affects 150 million people around the world, killing 500,000 people 
annually, according to the WHO. Hepatitis C: Fact Sheet N°164, WORLD HEALTH 
ORG., http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs164/en/# (last updated July 
2015); see also Avorn, supra note 29, at 1879 (“For example, Gilead Sciences did 
not invent its blockbuster treatment for hepatitis C, sofosbuvir (Sovaldi), which it 
priced at $1,000 per pill. Rather, it acquired the product from a small company 
founded by the drug’s inventor, a faculty member at Emory University, much of 
whose work on the usefulness of nucleoside viral inhibitors was federally funded. 
Gilead paid $11 billion in late 2011 for the rights to market Sovaldi, an amount it 
totally recouped in its first year of sales after approval of the drug in late 2013.”); 
Anderson, Fat Profits, supra note 28 (“[B]etween April and June [of 2014], drug 
company Gilead clocked sales of $3.5bn for its latest blockbuster hepatitis C drug 
Sovaldi.”). 
 65.  Abram, supra note 64; Douste-Blazy, supra note 64 (discussing how 
hepatitis C medicine prior to Sovaldi and Harvoni caused severe side effects that 
would discourage people from receiving treatment).  
 66.  Melissa Davey, Medicines Forecast to Cost Taxpayers Millions More in 
Secret TPP Trade Deal, GUARDIAN (Feb. 22, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/ 
australia-news/2015/feb/23/medicines-forecast-to-cost-taxpayers-millions-more-in-
secret-tpp-trade-deal. It was reported that during the summer of 2014, a number of 
European countries, including France and Spain, spent months negotiating with the 
company Gilead on the price of “Sovaldi.” The price fixed by Gilead was €56,000 
per patient for a twelve-week treatment, that is to say €666 per tablet. According to 
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states that “[i]f France were to treat all its hepatitis C patients with 
Sovaldi, it would add €1.5bn ($1.9bn; £1.2bn) to the country’s drugs 
bill.”67 This lack of an active diagnosis strategy, along with an 
exorbitant price of approximately €25,000 per treatment just for 
sofosbuvir, has conditioned a national plan that has only been able to 
commit to the treatment of 5,000 patients with new direct acting 
antivirals.68 This is despite the fact that some argue sofosbuvir is not 
even new as it was previously developed using published 
information and an existing compound.69 The list price of a year’s 
supply of Kalydeco, a medicine used in the treatment of cystic 
fibrosis is $311,000 and a standard course of treatment with Blincyto 
for treating leukemia is about $178,000.70 The newer chronic 
treatment regimes for HIV are close to $30,000, per year while 
several treatments for rare diseases are priced at more than $200,000 
per year.71 
Failure to provide proper public health care can be seen in other 
places as well. For example, in April 2014, the United Kingdom’s 
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence rejected ado-
 
the newspaper Le Monde, the price of each tablet was 280 times more than the 
production cost. In France, it is calculated that 250,000 patients should receive this 
medicine, the cost of which would represent 7% of the annual State medicine 
budget. For more, see Pascale Santi, Hépatite C: le nouveau hold-up des labos, LE 
MONDE (Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.lemonde.fr/sciences/article/2014/07/08/ 
nouveaux-traitements-de-l-hepatite-c-le-hold-up-des-labos_4452689_1650684. 
html; see also Pollack, High Cost, supra note 64 (detailing the United States’ 
Medicaid program’s struggle to pay for Sovaldi). 
 67.  Anderson, Pharmaceuticals, supra note 45. 
 68.  Beatriz Becerra Basterrechea et al., Life Saving Medicines and Patent 
Slaving Monopolies, PEAH (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.peah.it/2015/01/life-
saving-medicines-and-patent-slaving-monopolies/. 
 69.  Priti Radhakrishnan, One Way to Lower Drug Prices, CNN (June 2, 2015), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/06/02/opinions/radhakrishnan-drug-prices/index.html. 
 70.  Ransdell Pierson, Exclusive: Amgen’s New Leukemia Drug to Carry 
$178,000 Price Tag, REUTERS (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
amgen-cancer-exclusive-idUSKBN0JV1YU20141217; Joseph Walker, Costly 
Vertex Drug is Denied, and Medicaid Patients Sue, WALL ST. J. (July 16, 2014), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/costly-drug-vertex-is-denied-and-medicaid-patients-
sue-1405564205. 
 71.  James Love, TPP, Designed to Make Medicine More Expensive, Reforms 
More Difficult, MEDIUM (June 8, 2015), https://medium.com/@jamie_love/tpp-
designed-to-make-medicine-more-expensive-reforms-more-difficult-
e6a94a5d4a18#.3z1i4ps1v.  
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trastuzumab emtansine (Kadcyla), a new breast cancer medicine 
from Roche, whose treatment course cost £90,831 per patient, 
because it was too expensive for the National Health Service 
(“NHS”).72 In the United States, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer 
Center, in New York, refused to prescribe a new colorectal cancer 
drug priced at over $130,000 per year prompting the drug maker, 
Sanofi, to cut the price in half in 2012.73 Similar stories continue in 
many other parts in the world. MSF in a recent statement stated: 
Today we see increasing failures with our current system of research and 
development, whether with respect to Ebola, antibiotic resistance, or a 
range of neglected diseases. We also see unaffordable prices for essential 
new medicines, including up to 1000 USD per pill for new medicines to 
treat Hepatitis C.74 
The high prices of new medicines prompted more than 100 
influential oncologists from over fifteen countries recently to 
describe current prices of cancer medicines as “astronomical, 
unsustainable and even immoral”75 and urged that “moral 
 
 72.  Breast Cancer Drug Costing Tens of Thousands of Pounds More Than 
Other Treatments ‘Unaffordable’ for NHS, NICE (Apr. 23, 2014), 
http://www.nice.org.uk/news/press-and-media/breast-cancer-drug-costing-tens-of-
thousands-of-pounds-more-than-other-treatments-unaffordable-for-nhs; see also 
Velásquez, supra note 36, at 17 (finding that in another project, in 2010, “a group 
of English academics analysed the most prescribed drugs in the National Health 
Service (NHS) and calculated that approximately GBP 1 billion is wasted each 
year due to the prescription of patented ‘me too drugs’, for which there is an 
equally effective out of patent equivalent. What is considered to be a waste of State 
funds resulting from the use of patented medicines in the English system is the 
reality in developing countries simply because of the impossibility of accessing the 
medicine for the majority of the population”). 
 73.  Till, supra note 31. 
 74.  Katy Athersuch, Médecins Sans Frontières, Address to the 136th WHO 
Executive Board (Jan. 30, 2015) (transcript available at 
http://www.msfaccess.org/content/136th-who-eb-msf-intervention-gspa-public-
health-innovation-and-intellectual-property).  
 75.  Andrew Pollack, Doctors Denounce Cancer Drug Prices of $100,000 a 
Year, N.Y. TIMES, April 25, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/26/business/ 
cancer-physicians-attack-high-drug-costs.html?smid=pl-share; Jeremy Laurance, 
Makers of Anticancer Drugs are “Profiteering,” Say 100 Specialists from Around 
the World, BMJ, Apr. 30, 2013, at 1, 1; see Camille Abboud et al., The Price of 
Drugs for Chronic Myeloid Leukemia (CML) is a Reflection of the Unsustainable 
Prices of Cancer Drugs: From the Perspective of a Large Group of CML Experts, 
121 BLOOD 4439 (2013).   
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implications” should prevail in order to treat patients rather than 
focus on profits.76 
Finally, one should remember the “morning after” effect. In the 
course of the coming years, producers will face challenge of the 
expiry and/or revocation of a number of famous brand name 
patents.77 Expiry of patents on key blockbuster drugs (“described as 
the patent cliff”) is approaching soon.78 One 2012 estimate by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers projects that between 2012 and 2018, patent 
expiry and consequent generic entry will reduce revenues of R&D-
based pharmaceutical companies by about $148 billion.79 Stephen 
Whitehead, chief executive of the Association of the British 
Pharmaceuticals Industry, explains that “[o]ver the past three or four 
years, we have seen the biggest collection of patent expiries in 
history” and based on this he estimates that “[t]his has cost the 
industry some £150bn ($240bn).”80 Indeed as Burdon and Sloper 
explains in another study that the sales of Prozac fell 66% in the last 
year following the expiry of patent protection which in subsequently 
resulted in  Eli Lilly’s reduction  of its profit estimates three times in 
the last twelve months.81 There is no doubt then that the opening of 
the market for the entry of generic producers would hit hard these 
companies and reduce prices to a margin of what it used to be sold 
for.82 
 
 76.  Abboud et al., supra note 75, at 4439.   
 77.  See generally Jack DeRuiter & Pamela L. Holston, Drug Patent Expiration 
and the “Patent Cliff”, U.S. PHARMACIST (June 20, 2012), 
http://www.uspharmacist.com/content/s/216/c/35249/dnnprintmode/true/skinsrc/ 
(estimating that top drug companies may lose hundreds of billions of dollars in the 
near future to generic competition).  
 78.  See id. (defining the “patent cliff” as a period where a number of lucrative 
pharmaceutical patents will reach their expiration date).  
 79.  STEVE ARLINGTON, PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS, FROM VISION TO 
DECISION, PHARMA 2020 6 (2012).  
 80.  Anderson, Pharmaceuticals, supra note 45. 
 81.  Michael Burdon & Kristie Sloper, The Art of Using Secondary Patents to 
Improve Protection, 3 INT’L J. MED. MARKETING 226, 226-27 (2003) (discussing 
similar losses for GlaxoSmithKline’s AUGMENTIN and Akzo Nobel’s 
REMERO). 
 82.  See MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES [MSF], UNTANGLING THE WEB OF 
ANTIRETROVIRAL PRICE REDUCTIONS 4 (13th ed. 2010) (explaining that 
competition from generic medicines for AIDS treatment caused the price of the 
first line triple therapy (estavudine, lamivudine, and nevirapine) to drop from 
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Calls urging pharmaceutical companies to direct their investments 
where real impact may be felt—i.e. inventing new medicines 
affecting the majority of citizens all over the world—have been made 
in recent times. Simply put, to effectively channel available 
resources towards production lines rather than other promotional and 
marketing activities.83 
III. EVERGREENING, MORE PATENTS, AND 
MORE MONOPOLY 
Faced with the aforementioned challenges, the pharmaceutical 
industry has been working to identify additional venues to sustain its 
revenue streams. The need to find alternative routes for monopoly 
protection through reinventing the “lifecycle management” of its 
drugs prompted it to shift its focus on another area.84 Rather than 
focusing on finding optimal solutions for its productivity challenges 
and R&D problems, the focus shifted towards legislative norms and 
legal doctrines. The obsession with “evergreening” in the industry 
may be seen as one outcome of these initiatives.85 
 
approximately $10,000 per patient per year in 2000 to approximately $67 per 
patient per year). 
 
 83.  See Marc-André Gagnon & Joel Lexchin, The Cost of Pushing Pills: A 
New Estimate of Pharmaceutical Promotion Expenditures in the United States, 5 
PLOS MED., no. 1, 2008, at 29, 32 (concluding that available data indicates more 
resources are spent on marketing medicines rather than on researching and 
developing new drugs); Novartis Set to Remain Top Spender as R&D Investment 
Dips, EVALUATE (June 18, 2012), https://www.evaluategroup.com/Universal/ 
View.aspx?type=Story&id=302035&isEPVantage=yes (noting that the industry 
spent $135 billion on research in 2011, which is less than 20% of sales); see also 
Joseph Engelberg et al., Financial Conflicts of Interest in Medicine 38-39 (Jan. 
2014) (working paper) (on file with University of California San Diego Rady 
School of Management) (finding that pharmaceutical companies engage in 
marketing techniques that encourage rent-seeking behaviour on the part of doctors 
who prescribe the company’s drugs).  
 84.  Stan Bernard, Rethinking Product Lifecycle Management, 
PHARMEXEC.COM (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.pharmexec.com/print/197858? 
page=full (challenging the pharmaceutical industry’s traditional approach of only 
marketing a drug during its product lifecycle—regulatory approval to expiration of 
the patent). 
 85.  See generally Kate S. Gaudry, Evergreening: A Common Practice to 
Protect New Drugs, 29 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 876, 878 (2011) (explaining that 
pharmaceutical companies frequently engage in an evergreening strategy, which 
utilizes patent law and FDA regulations to extend a company’s patent monopolies 
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Accordingly, more patents and monopoly term extension 
represented an integral element of the industry’s modern 
management of its portfolios. An investigation carried out by the 
European Union about the conduct and practices of the 
pharmaceutical industry between the years 2000 and 2007 found that 
a single medicine can be protected at the same time by up to 1300 
patents or pending patent applications.86 Moreover, the number and 
volume of lawsuits between originator companies and generic 
companies has increased four-fold in the European Union.87 The 
same study found that these lawsuits delay the entry of the generic 
product to the market between six months and six years.88 The study 
estimates that the savings resulting from the entry of generics could 
have been approximately €3 billion, if the entry had occurred 
immediately after the loss of exclusivity.89 In the United States, 
Frank reports that branded drug firms “now carry an average of 10 
patents for each drug—as compared with an average of 2 a decade 
earlier.”90 
In the light of the above discussion and the stagnation in the 
pharmaceutical production of new medical entities, one may assume 
that logically, the number of patents should drop drastically. To the 
contrary, the recent decade witnessed phenomenal growth in the 
number of patents granted in all fields including medicines.91 For 
 
and FDA-grated exclusivities).  
 86.  See Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry – Preliminary Report, Fact Sheet 
“Originator-Generic Competition”, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/fact_sheet_2.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 
2016) (adding that many patent applications are submitted very late in a drug’s life 
cycle in order to achieve the longest exclusivity period possible). 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  See Communication from the Commission, Executive Summary of the 
Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report, at 11, SEC (2009) 952 (July 8, 2009) 
(finding that the average duration of court proceedings was 2.8 years). 
 89.  Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry – Preliminary Report, Fact Sheet “Prices, 
Time to Generic Entry and Consumer Savings”, EUR. COMM’N, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/fact_sheet_1.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2016).   
 90.  Richard G. Frank, The Ongoing Regulation of Generic Drugs, 357 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1993, 1994 (2007). 
 91.  See Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents 6 (Fed. 
Reserve Bank St. Louis Research Div., Working Paper No. 2012-035A, 2012) 
(contrasting the rising number of patents over the last thirty years with a lack of 
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instance, in 1983 in the United States, 59,715 patents were issued; by 
2003, 189,597 patents were issued; and in 2010, 244,341 patents 
were approved.92 In less than three decades, the number of granted 
patents more than quadrupled. At the same time, neither substantial 
innovation occurred nor research and development expenditure were 
demonstrated to correspond to the growth in the number of granted 
patents.93 
The above may be explained in part by the industry’s attempt to 
prolong and extend the patent protection term resulting from 
“evergreening” activities. A look at a number of specific examples 
would be useful to illustrate the trend. 
The drug Atorvastatin calcium is one of the most cited examples 
in this regard.94 The drug is the medication for the treatment of high 
cholesterol and was approved by the U.S. Food and Drugs 
Administration (FDA) in December 1996 and was first marketed in 
1997.95 The drug became one of the best-selling and successful drugs 
in history.96 Notably, a patent was granted earlier for this drug in the  
United States in 1987, and was due to  expire in May 2006. However 
and prior to its expiry in 2006, the patent was  extended to September 
2009 under a patent term extension provision.97 Subsequently, the 
exclusivity period of the initial  patent was also extended for an 
additional period of six months, to March 2010, under a paediatric 
exclusivity provision.98 
In another 2012 study, Amin and Kesselheim identified the 
evergreening patents associated with two important HIV medicines, 
ritonavir and lopinavir.99 Their study found that the original ritonavir 
 
increase in R&D expenditure or innovation). 
 92.  Id.  
 93.  Id. at 19-20 (“[I]t is apparent that the recent explosion of patents in the 
U.S., the E.U. and Japan, has not brought about anything comparable in terms of 
useful innovations and aggregate productivity.”). 
 94.  See, e.g., Hans Georg Bartels et al., PROMOTING ACCESS TO MEDICAL 
TECHNOLOGIES AND INNOVATION: INTERSECTIONS BETWEEN PUBLIC HEALTH, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TRADE 183 (2012) (highlighting the case of 
Atorvastatin calcium to exemplify the problem of patent term extensions). 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Tahir Amin & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Secondary Patenting Of Branded 
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patent was filed in the United States in 1995, granted in 1996 and 
was due to expire on April 25, 2015.100 The original lopinavir patent 
was filed in 1996, granted in 1999, and is due to expire on November 
21, 2016. Amin and Kesselheim found as of April 2011, a further 
108 patent items were found for these two medicines—eighty-two 
granted patents and twenty-six applications.101 Together these 
evergreening patents could delay generic entry to at least 2028—
some thirteen to fourteen additional years after original patent 
expiry.102 These evergreening patents cover related chemical 
structures, methods of manufacture and methods of treatment.103 
Another interesting case of evergreening is related to Tricor-1, a 
cholesterol-fighting drug which rights were exclusively acquired by 
Abbott in 2000.104 Following the lapse of the drug exclusivity 
protection, a generic pharmaceutical company (Novopharm) applied 
to the U.S. FDA to produce generic versions of the drug, which 
would have resulted in the reduction of the price by 80%.105 To delay 
the production of the generic version, Abbott filed for patent 
infringement lawsuit which took months, and at the same time 
enabled Abbott to produce Tricor-2 (which was almost exactly the 
same as Tricor-1 with only difference in dosage where Tricor-1 came 
in 67- and 134-milligram formulations, Tricor-2 would come in 54- 
and 160-milligram dosages).106 By the time Novopharm’s generic 
 
Pharmaceuticals: A Cast Study of How Patents On Two HIV Drugs Could Be 
Extended For Decades, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2286 (2012) (asserting that the secondary 
patents used to protect ritonavir and lopinavir from generic competition 
demonstrate the widespread practice of pharmaceutical manufactures seeking to 
extend market exclusivity for their products on questionable grounds).  
 100.  Id. at 2288. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. at 2286.  
 103.  Id. at 2288-89 (finding that the largest category of patents and applications 
covered chemical structures, compositions, or formulations, which affect the 
drug’s physical properties, such as stability, solubility, dissolution rate, absorption, 
and bioavailability). 
 104.  Sarah Kliff, Want To Cut Health Care Costs? Start Here., WASH. POST 
(Apr. 21, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/want-to-
cut-health-care-costs-start-here/2012/04/20/gIQA2P0NWT_blog.html. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  See Nicholas S. Downing et al., How Abbott’s Fenofibrate Franchise 
Avoided Generic Competition, 172 ARCH INTERN MED. 724 (2012) (observing that 
due to Abbott’s patent litigation, Tricor-2 did not face generic competition when it 
  
396 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [31:3 
came onto the market, Abbott had already introduced Tricor-2 and 
“made it doctors’ prescription of choice.”107 Six months after its 
introduction onto the market, Tricor-2’s share represented  97 
percent of all prescriptions for this type of medication in the market, 
known as Fenofibrates.108 This was not the end of the story, over the 
past decade, Abbott repeated the same process a few times, Tricor-3 
(renamed with a different dosage branded Tripilix) replaced Tricor-
2.109 The cost implications of Abbott’s strategy were huge according 
to the Annals of Internal Medicine which estimated that “if the 
health-care system had come to rely on Novopharm’s generic 
medication, our health-care system would be saving $700 million 
every year. Overall, the use of generic drugs is estimated to save the 
country $158 billion annually, which breaks down to $3 billion a 
week.”110 
Finally, a more current example is the case of Eli Lilly’s lung 
cancer drug sold as Alimta.111 This drug has been generating  over $2 
million in annual sales and it is projected that it will  generate $3.5 
billion by 2016.112 The patent on the initial protected compound is 
due  to expire in 2017 however  Eli Lilly filed and obtained a second 
patent on the method of using the compound together with vitamins. 
This second patent would last until 2022.113 This will have huge 
financial implications. 
Other studies indicate the impact of evergreening.114 Kapczynski et 
al. found that secondary claims were common and added, on 
average, 6.5 years to patent life and that patents which were filed late 
 
launched).  
 107.  Kliff, supra note 104.  
 108.  Id. 
 109.  See id. (describing the cycle of reformulation and renewed exclusivity for 
the drug whenever generic competition seemed likely at the new dose level). 
 110.  Id.   
 111.  See Ho, supra note 42, at 315. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. at 316.  
 114.  See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski et al., Polymorphs and Prodrugs and Salts (Oh 
My!): An Empirical Analysis of “Secondary” Pharmaceutical Patents, 7 PLOS 
ONE, no.12, Dec. 2012, at 1, 2-3 (stating that a better understanding of secondary 
patenting is necessary because pharmaceutical companies view these patents as 
crucial to their business models and only a few large-sample empirical studies of 
secondary patents exist).
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during the life of the original compound were “more common for 
higher sales drugs.”115 The same study found: 
[E]liminating secondary patents could free up 36% of new medicines for 
generic production, since only 64% of drugs in our sample had patents 
with chemical compound claims. Additionally, for those drugs that still 
come under patent because a chemical compound claim exists, exclusions 
on secondary patents could limit the duration of patent protection by 4–5 
years.116 
In Australia, a 2013 study “analysing all of the patents associated 
with 15 of the costliest drugs in Australia over the last 20 years” 
found that on average, there are forty-nine patents per Active 
Pharmaceutical Ingredient (API), of which about 25% are held by the 
originator company—about twelve evergreening patents per API.117 
In addition, the European Commission Enquiry Report found that in 
Europe evergreening patenting is prevalent for pharmaceuticals and 
again the average number of patents per API was greater for the 
highest volume medicines.118 
 
 115.  Id. at 1 (adding that secondary patents on method of use extend patent life 
by 7.4 years on average); see also Ron A. Bouchard et al., Empirical Analysis of 
Drug Approval-Drug Patenting Linkage For High Value Pharmaceuticals, 8 NW. 
J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 174, 174-75 (2010) (examining the “paradoxical drug 
approval-drug patenting linkage,” which provides the largest scope of intellectual 
property protection to modified drugs rather than true innovation); Lisa Larrimore 
Ouellette, Note, How Many Patents Does It Take to Make A Drug? Follow-On 
Pharmaceutical Patents and University of Licensing, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. 
L. REV. 299, 320 (2010) (finding that drugs patented by public-sector institutions 
are less likely than their private-sector counterparts to have secondary patents, yet 
over half of public sector drugs still have secondary patents).  
 116.  Kapczynski et al., supra note 114, at 8. 
 117.  Andrew F. Christie et al., Patents Associated With High-Cost Drugs in 
Australia, 8 PLOS ONE, no. 4, Apr. 2013, at 1, 8 (discovering that the roughly 
seventy five percent of patents owned by companies other than the drug’s 
originator were mostly held by companies that did not have a record of developing 
top-selling drugs).  
 118.  See EUR. COMM’N, PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR INQUIRY, supra note 46, at 
352 (questioning the efficacy of using secondary patents for follow-on products as 
a means of preventing generic competition); see also Hazel V. J. Moir et al., 
Assessing the Impact of Alternative Patent Systems on the Cost of Health Care: 
The TPPA and HIV Treatment in Vietnam 10 (Nov. 27, 2014) (unpublished 
conference paper) (“For top-selling medicines the average number of patents and 
patent applications was 237, compared to 98 for medicines in general.”). 
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Interestingly, evergreening activities are not limited to prolonging 
the protection term through the granting of additional legal 
protection by patent offices. For instance, the drug Efexor is an 
antidepressant drug developed by Pfizer which had major side effects 
leading to its recall from the market in 2014.119 In its attempt to deal 
with the side effects of the said drug, “Pfizer subsequently developed 
new slow-release versions of the drug, called Efexor-XR, which 
significantly reduced its side-effects.”120 Pfizer attempted to claim 
further protection proclaiming that the slow-release versions were 
different enough from the original to be granted new patents. 
Although the claim was rejected, the legal battle delayed cheaper 
generic versions of the drug from entering the market for two and 
half years.121 A recent 2015 study explains the impact, stating that 
“[b]y the time this patent was eventually declared invalid, the delay 
to the generic market had cost taxpayers $209 million.”122 Moreover, 
the study found that in general “evergreening” could delay generic 
competition for up to twenty years.123 
IV. THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND ITS HEALTH-
RELATED FLEXIBILITIES 
Although the TRIPS Agreement was criticised by many for being 
in favour of technology exporting countries,124 the mood shifted 
 
 119.  See Caroline Cassels, Pfizer Recalls Effexor Antidepressant, WEBMD 
(Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.webmd.com/depression/news/20140307/pfizer-recall-
effexor (announcing the recall of Effexor because of possible contamination with a 
heart drug that could cause faintness, dizziness, and abnormal or increased 
heartbeat).   
 120.  Davey, supra note 66 (observing that the slow-release version of the drug 
became more widely prescribed than the original). 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id.  
 123.  See Deborah H. Gleeson et al., Costs to Australian Taxpayers of 
Pharmaceutical Monopolies As Proposals to Extend Them In the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement, 202 MED. J. AUSTL. 306, 306-07 (2015) (reporting that, in 
1998, Australia introduced five-year delays for patents to be extended, and the 
extensions in 2012-2013 have cost the Public Benefits Scheme an estimated $480 
million in the long-term).  
 124.  See Peter Drahos, BITs and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 
J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 791, 802 (2001) (arguing that the benefits of TRIPS flow 
towards the two leading exporters of intellectual property, the United States and 
the European Union, because the most favoured nation principle in the WTO 
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during the last decade towards calling upon developing countries to 
deal with the agreement by taking a more pragmatic approach. In this 
regard, calls to utilize and explore the policy space available under 
the agreement have been made by many academics, civil society 
groups, and various non-governmental organizations.125 
The suggested approach calls upon developing countries to 
activate and use the flexibilities available to them under the 
agreement in a more pro-active manner. Exploring the “policy space” 
as suggested, would mitigate the negative monopolistic impact of the 
agreement on these countries and would also go some way in 
assisting these countries when dealing with their national public 
health challenges.126 
Following are some examples of the health-related flexibilities 
available under the agreement to member states: 
- Transitional periods. According to the WTO, least developed countries 
(LDCs) are given an extended transition period to protect intellectual 
property under the WTO’s TRIPS Agreement.127 This is in recognition of 
their special requirements and status, their economic, financial and 
administrative constraints, and the need for flexibility so that they can 
create a viable technological base. Under TRIPS Council Decision, IP/C/
25, Extension of the Transition Period under article 66.1 of the TRIPS 
Agreement for LDC Members for Certain Obligations with Respect to 
Pharmaceutical Products, LDC members were not obliged, with respect to 
pharmaceutical products, to implement or apply sections 5 (Patents) and 7 
(Protection of Undisclosed Information) or to enforce rights provided for 
under these sections from the TRIPS Agreement until January 1, 2016.128 
Under General Council decision, WT/L/478, “the obligations of least-
developed country Members under paragraph 9 of article 70 of the TRIPS 
Agreement shall be waived with respect to pharmaceutical products until 
January 1, 2016.” A request on behalf of LDCs for further extension was 
 
requires all WTO members who have entered into a TRIPS agreement to extend 
the benefits to all other WTO members).  
 125.  See, e.g., SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE 
GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 17-20 (2003) 
(contextualizing TRIPS in the larger movement of international neo-liberalism 
championed by U.S. foreign policy).  
 126.  See generally COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, supra note 5.   
 127.  Id. at 162 (maintaining that least developed countries could use transitional 
period extensions to give them the opportunity to devise appropriate intellectual 
property regimes and establish administrative and regulatory infrastructure).  
 128.  Id. at 40. 
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made late 2014 and an extension was granted accordingly.129 
- Compulsory licensing. A tool which the state authorizes a third party to 
exploit patented inventions, generally against a specified royalty made to 
the patent holder provided that  several conditions set under the TRIPS 
Agreement are complied with.130 The objective  behind this is to curtail  
anti-competitive behaviour and ensure the transfer of technology and 
dissemination of knowledge. 
- Government use exceptions. A tool which grants the state the right to 
use the patent without obtaining the consent of the patent holder for the 
purpose of public interest, including public health necessities. Although 
government use conditions are similar to compulsory licensing, 
government use exceptions provides an added advantage by fast-tracking 
the process, through  granting the government the right to use the 
pharmaceutical patent without the need for prior negotiations with the 
owner.131 
- Parallel importation. This tool gives the option to obtain patented 
products when they are lawfully available in a foreign market at a lower 
price, thus enabling countries to shop for cheaper patented products. This 
requires as a prerequisite that a country adopt an exhaustion regime 
suitable to its needs and priorities.132 
- Exceptions to patents rights. Article 30 of TRIPS provides that 
members “may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights 
conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably 
conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of 
the legitimate interests of third parties.”133 However, the above provision  
does not define the scope of the permissible exceptions thus awarding 
member countries some considerable discretion to operate. Examples of 
these exceptions include the Bolar exception and the research and 
experimental use exception.134 
 
 129.  Id. at 51 (remarking that least developed countries with domestic 
legislation protecting pharmaceutical patents would need to amend their laws to 
take advantage of the Doha Declaration’s deferral of pharmaceutical patent 
protection until at least 2016). 
 130.  See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establish the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (listing the 
limitations on use of intellectual property by third-parties authorized by the 
government).  
 131.  Id. art. 8.  
 132.  See id. art. 6 (declaring that exhaustion of intellectual property rights is not 
relevant to the dispute settlement process under TRIPS). 
 133.  Id. art. 30. 
 134.  See MOHAMMED K. EL SAID, PUBLIC HEALTH RELATED TRIPS-PLUS 
PROVISIONS IN BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, A POLICY GUIDE FOR 
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- Standards of patentability. Under TRIPS, patent protection must be 
granted for products and processes which are new, involve an inventive 
step and are industrially applicable.135 However, each of these  are not 
defined and can be interpreted and applied by member states in 
accordance with their national priorities and objectives. “For example, 
TRIPS does not specify the patenting of new uses of known products, 
including pharmaceutical drugs, thus allowing member countries the 
possibility of rejecting these new uses for lack of novelty, inventive step 
or industrial applicability.”136 
- Other procedural flexibilities. Another  identified  policy tool that may 
be used to improve  the quality of granted  patents and limits 
“evergreening” is pre-grant and post-grant patent oppositions, in addition 
to  patent revocation proceedings.137 These methods have been used at 
different times in a wide range of developed and developing countries.  
Such proceedings enable  interested parties to bring claims  before the 
patent office on the basis that a particular patent does not meet local 
requirements.138 
Although these flexibilities are available for member states to put 
into practise, the above flexibilities do not apply automatically in 
many instances but require a great deal of legislative, administrative 
and institutional effort. Accordingly, these flexibilities should be 
explicitly incorporated under the national legal regime of as a part of 
a pro-active national agenda.139 
 
 
NEGOTIATORS AND IMPLEMENTORS IN THE WHO EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN 
REGION 127 (2010) [hereinafter EL SAID, PUBLIC HEALTH] (explaining that the 
Bolar exception permits the use of a patented invention for the purpose of 
obtaining approval of a generic product before the patent expires, and the 
experimental use exception allows for the use of a patented product in scientific 
and commercial experimentation without the consent of the patent holder). 
 135.  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 136, art. 27. 
 136.  EL SAID, PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 134, at 128. 
 137.  Mohammed El Said & Amy Kapczynski, Access to Medicines: The Role 
Of Intellectual Property Law and Policy 5 (July 9, 2011) (working paper) (on file 
with Global Commission on HIV and the Law) (adding that the period to initiate 
post-grant opposition applications varies between countries). 
 138.  Id. at 6 (citing examples of successful pre and post-grant patent 
oppositions in Thailand and India).   
 139.  Id. at 9 (commenting that few countries in Africa, Latin America, and parts 
of Asia have adopted the full range of flexibilities permissible); see also EL SAID, 
PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 134, at 128 (asserting that implementing these 
flexibilities in a national legal regime may involve new national committees, 
legislative tools and bylaws, and proper judicial training). 
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The actual utilization and use of the above flexibilities has in fact 
supported the above view regarding their importance. Many case 
studies from both developed and developing countries affirm the role 
played by these flexibilities in enhancing the affordability and 
accessibility of medicines to patients all over the world.140 
There is no scarcity of evidence with relation to the positive 
impact compulsory licensing has had upon improving access to 
medicines. For instance, Canada used the system many times in order 
to ensure that products were made available to the public at the 
lowest possible price while also rewarding the inventor reasonably.141 
Ho comments on Canada’s experience stating that “this was 
Canada’s approach and until NAFTA, over a thousand applications 
for compulsory licenses were made and the majority were 
granted.”142 With relation to medicines and between the years 1969 
and 1987, Canada used compulsory licensing provisions to promote 
competition between originator medicines and generics.143 As 
recently as 1987, the use of compulsory licensing provisions was 
curtailed due to change in policy.144 Jones et al. investigated the 
impact of originator-generic competition on medicine prices between 
the years 1981 and 1994 in Canada.145 In a study that sampled eighty-
two therapeutic drug categories, they found that generic competition 
 
 140.  See, e.g., EL SAID, PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 134, at 131 (providing a 
case study on the use of flexibilities in India). 
 141.  See Ho, supra note 42, at 328 (remarking that despite Canada’s intention 
to give due reward to the inventor, patent owners tend to find compulsory license 
schemes as unsatisfactory). 
 142.  Id.; see also Jerome H. Reichman & Catherine Hasenzahl, Non-Voluntary 
Licensing of Patented Inventions: Historical Perspective, Legal Framework Under 
TRIPS, and Overview of the Practice in Canada and the USA v (UNCTAD-ICTSD 
Project on IPRS and Sustainable Dev., Issue Paper No. 5, 2003) (holding that 
Canada’s regular use of compulsory licenses for pharmaceuticals allowed it to 
establish a generic medicine industry providing low prices of consumer drugs). 
 143.  Reichman & Hasenzahl, supra note 142, at 20 (claiming that Canada’s 
compulsory licensing scheme produced some of the lowest consumer drug prices 
in the industrialized world). 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  See J.C.H. Jones et al., Patents, Brand-Generic Competition and the 
Pricing of Ethical Drugs in Canada: Some Empirical Evidence from British 
Columbia, 1981-1994, 33 APPLIED ECON. 947, 947 (2001) (stating that the study 
used a sample of eighty-two drugs from the British Columbia Pharmacare 
Programme). 
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moderated medicine prices but that this effect was reduced after 
1987.146 They also found that price decrease after 1987 was slower 
and lower. Within the generics market, there is a strong effect of first 
entry, with the first generic gaining a substantial market share as well 
as prices above the minimum.147 The overall conclusion from the 
study is the well-established fact; “that facilitating generic entry, and 
therefore competition, would reduce prices.”148 
There has been a noticeable increase in the use of compulsory 
licensing by developing countries in recent years too. India recently 
issued one compulsory license.149 In March 2013, India issued a 
compulsory license to Natco Pharma to manufacture an affordable 
generic version of the German pharmaceutical company Bayer 
AG’s kidney and liver cancer drug Nexavar (chemotherapy drug 
sorafenib tosylate) in the Indian market.150 The compulsory license 
effect on the drug’s price was clear and substantial: it brought down 
the prices to approximately $160 for a month’s dose—a fraction of 
the original price of approximately $5,098.151 The  conditions  of the 
compulsory licence grants  Bayer a six per cent royalty only on sales 
by Natco.152 
Another example is related to Brazil’s issuance of compulsory 
licenses. In 2007, the country issued a compulsory license for the 
antiretroviral (“ARV”) drug Efavirenz.153 The drug is mostly used 
 
 146.  See id. at 955 (finding that after market exclusivity was extended to 
branded drugs in 1987, generic competition’s moderating effect was reduced). 
 147.  See id. at 954 (concluding that generic first mover prices typically 
exceeded minimum generic prices by 10% or more).  
 148.  Moir et al., supra note 118, at 13. 
 149.  See Patralekha Chatterjee, India’s First Compulsory License Upheld, but 
Legal Fights Likely to Continue, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Apr. 3, 2013), 
http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/03/04/indias-first-compulsory-licence-upheld-but-
legal-fights-likely-to-continue/ (reporting the Indian judiciary’s verdict upholding 
the first compulsory licence issued to an Indian generic drug manufacturer). 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  See id. (adding that Doctors Without Borders urged Bayer to refrain from 
appealing the compulsory license grant considering the reality that Bayer’s prices 
were too high for the Indian market). 
 152.  Id. (noting that the 7% royalty awarded to Bayer is higher than some 
national and international royalty guidelines).   
 153.  See Very Zolotaryova, Are We There Yet?: Taking “TRIPS” To Brazil And 
Expanding Access to HIV/AIDS Medication, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1099, 1099 
(2007) (recounting that the Brazilian President’s decree to import a generic version 
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imported ARV for AIDS treatment in Brazil (covering approximately 
38% of HIV patients).154 The current prices sold by the manufacture 
(Merck) at that time, were $580 per patient per year.155 As a result of 
compulsory licensing, the prices charged for generic product resulted 
in an annual cost per patient in the range between $163 to $166.156 
Based on this, savings of around $236 million were estimated to have 
been made by the year 2012, when the patent expired.157 
Thailand also provides an active developing country case study in 
that regard.158 The country issued so far more compulsory licenses 
than any other developing country with relation to medicines. 
Between 2005 and 2006, the Thai government issued multiple 
compulsory licences.159 Two of the licences covered ARVs 
(Efavirenz, marketed as Stocrin by Merck, and Lopinavir/Ritonavir, 
marketed as Kaletra by Abbott).160 These compulsory licences 
resulted in substantial price reduction  and  increase in the number of  
patients receiving the medicine in the country. For instance, the 
immediate result of issuing the Efavirenz licence was the acquisition 
by the Thai health authorities of its generic version from the Indian 
producer Ranbaxy for USD$216 per patient/year, over a 50% 
decrease from Merck’s price of USD$468.161 By early 2008 the 
number of patients using Lopinavir/Ritonavir had tripled in 
Thailand.162 
More recently, in April 2010, the Ecuadorean intellectual property 
office granted its first compulsory licence, also for the ARV 
 
of Merck’s Efavirenez came after the company failed to negotiate an appropriate 
price with the government of Brazil). 
 154.  Id. at 1111, n. 84. 
 155.  Beatrice Stirner, Compulsory Licensing of Efavirenz in Brazil, Summary of 
the Presentation of J.M. do Nascimento Júnior, ACCESS TO PHARMACEUTICALS 
(Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.accesstopharmaceuticals.org/case-studies-in-global-
health/efavirenz-brazil/. 
 156.  See id. 
 157.  MARTIN KHOR, COMPULSORY LICENSE AND “GOVERNMENT USE” TO 
PROMOTE ACCESS TO MEDICINES: SOME EXAMPLES 15 (2014).  
 158.  El Said & Kapczynski, supra note 137, at 7. 
 159.  Id.  
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Id. 
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combination of Lopinavir/Ritonavir.163 The licence resulted in 
substantial decrease in the prices of the medicine. It was reported that 
Ecuador’s compulsory licence “immediately reduced the cost of a 
major public HIV drug purchase . . . by 27 percent” and it is 
expected that prices will fall further, reaching a reduction of over 
50%.164 As the above examples show, the issuance of compulsory 
licenses can result in substantial reduction of prices and 
improvement of accessibility of drugs to patients. 
Another important flexibility is government use licenses. For 
instance, Ghana issued a government use order in 2005 to import 
from India generic versions of selected ARVs which are patented in 
Ghana for HIV drugs to be used for the purposes of government use 
in the country.165 Some estimates that the cost of ARVs dropped as a 
result more than 50% from $495 to $235 for year’s treatment.166 In 
another case, Malaysia was the first country in Asia to issue a 
“government use” licence for the importation of generic ARVs in 
2003.167 This resulted in reducing the average cost of the Malaysian’s 
Ministry of Health treatment per patient per month from $315 to $58, 
an 81% reduction.168 
More recently, the issue of patentability criteria has been subject 
to increased legal debate in a number of countries.169 India has one of 
the strictest patentability criteria that could be found anywhere in the 
world.170 To the dissatisfaction of drug producers who started to find 
it more difficult to obtain new patents there (especially on minor 
improvements or new/second uses), challenges to the system were 
made.171 More specifically, section 3(d) of the 1970 India Patents Act 
 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  KHOR, supra note 157, at 10.  
 166.  Id. at 15. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  Id.  
 169.  See, e.g., Patralekha Chatterjee, Novartis Loses Patent Bid: Lessons From 
India’s 3(d) Experience, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.ip-
watch.org/2013/04/01/novartis-loses-patent-bid-lessons-from-indias-3d-
experience/ [hereinafter Chatterjee, Novartis] (describing the Indian Supreme 
Court’s decision to uphold more stringent standards for granting patents). 
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was the target of such challenge. The section prohibits patenting of 
new uses of known products (including medicines) and new forms, 
formulations, and dosages unless they shows significant 
enhancements of therapeutic efficacy.172 This provision has recently 
led to the denial of a patent to Novartis on the cancer medicine, 
imatinib mesylate (sold by Novartis as Glivec), leading to a seven-
year court battle culminating in the Indian Supreme Court’s 
reaffirmation of the strict interpretation of section 3(d).173 In 2014, 
the same section of the India Patent Act “was used to deny a patent 
on Gilead’s blockbuster hepatitis C medicine, sofosbuvir (sold by 
Gilead as Solvadi),174 potentially saving India and the developing 
world hundreds of millions of dollars in treatment costs.”175 The 
results of the consistent Indian approach were evident. It was found 
that “[o]ver the next five years, as a result, the continued availability 
of generic drugs saved governments half a billion dollars globally 
and medicines reached 13 million people living with HIV/AIDS 
worldwide.”176 
Other countries are increasingly following India’s patentability 
path. The Philippines patent law, as amended in 2008, introduced a 
section similar to the Indian 3(d) section (although less stringent than 
India’s Patent Act).177
 
China has reformed its Patent Act in 2008 and 
 
appealed by pharmaceutical companies).  
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. 
 174.  It was reported that Egypt also followed suit by finding the application 
lacking novelty. Although no official rejection was made yet, it was reported: 
[S]enior official at EGYPO has said that Egypt will not grant sofosbuvir a patent. The 
reason lies in the weakness of the application submitted by the company. Technical 
examination of the compound has revealed that it is not novel chemically, and 
therefore does not fulfill the criteria of novelty and inventiveness, both of which are 
necessary for a pharmaceutical compound to be patented. 
See Heba Wanis, Egypt Will Not Patent New Hepatitis C Drug, MADA MASR (May 
23, 2014), http://www.madamasr.com/opinion/egypt-will-not-patent-new-hepatitis-
c-drug.   
 175.  Brook K. Baker, Opinion: Prof Brook K Baker on the Impact of US 
Pressure to Change India’s IP Laws, FIN. EXPRESS (Jan. 30, 2015), 
http://www.financialexpress.com/article/pharma/latest-updates/opinion-prof-
brook-k-baker-on-the-impact-of-us-pressure-to-change-indias-ip-laws/36919/.  
 176.  Priti Radhakrishan, One Way to Lower Drug Prices, CNN (June 2, 2015), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/02/opinions/radhakrishnan-drug-prices/.  
 177.  Carolos M. Correa, Tackling the Proliferation of Patents: How to Avoid 
Undue Limitation to Competition and the Public Domain 6 (South Ctr., Working 
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in a similar fashion to that of India’s law, introduced a more rigorous 
standard for the non-obviousness requirement.178 According to the 
recent Chinese Patent Act, in order for the non-obviousness 
requirement to be fulfilled, the invention must possess prominent and 
substantive differentiating features, as well as be representative of 
significant improvement in comparison with the state of the art.179 
Aiming to strengthen the standards for patent granting, “Australia 
adopted in 2012 the ‘Raising the Bar Act’ which, inter alia, raised the 
requirements for patentability and disclosure, and expanded the 
grounds for re-examination of a granted patent to all substantive 
grounds considered during examination.”180 
Following the same path, in 2012, Argentina introduced new 
guidelines on the patentability of pharmaceutical products and 
processes with the objective of limiting evergreening of 
pharmaceutical patents.181 The impact was visible in a short period of 
time. Velásquez demonstrates the impact by stating: 
A policy and strategy change at the patent office level could lead to 
significant changes. In Argentina, for example, after the introduction of 
new guidelines for the examination of pharmaceutical patents in 2012, the 
number of patents granted was 54, while in Mexico, a similar-sized 
market to Argentina, the number of patents granted in 2012 for 
 
Paper No. 52, 2014) [hereinafter Correa, Tackling] (“While in the latter the 
concept of enhanced efficacy – as a condition of patentability – is understood to 
allude to the ‘therapeutic efficacy’ of a drug, in Philippines it may encompass ‘any 
of the “advantageous properties” (e.g. bioavailability, stability, solubility among 
others) exhibited by the new form of a known substance.’”).   
 178.  See Patent Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, rev’d Dec. 27, 2008), art. 22, STATE INTELL. PROP. OFF. 
P.R.C. (China). 
 179.  Id.; see also IPR2, THIRD REVISION OF CHINA’S PATENT LAW, LEGAL 
TEXTS AND DOCUMENTS ON THE DRAFTING PROCESS 2006-2008 art. 22 (2010). 
 180.  Correa, Tackling, supra note 177. 
 181.  See Federico A. Aulmann, New Patentability Guidelines for 
Pharmaceutical Inventions, INT’L L. OFFICE (Aug. 6, 2012), 
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/Newsletters/Intellectual-Property/ 
Argentina/Obligado-Cia/New-patentability-guidelines-for-pharmaceutical-
inventions (“[T]he new resolution affects the possibility of obtaining patent 
protection for pharmaceutical inventions by changing the criteria by which the 
novelty and inventive step of such inventions will be examined, or even 
considering some as discoveries instead of inventions.”). 
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pharmaceutical products was 2500.182 
In conclusion, there are clear benefits made as a result of the 
utilisation of the TRIPS flexibilities resulting in lowering drug prices 
and increasing the accessibility of medicines at the national level. 
V. THE RATHCHING UP OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY PROTECTION AND THE NEGATIVE 
IMPACT OF TRIPS-PLUS RULES ON PUBLIC 
HEALTH AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 
As a result of these challenges facing the pharmaceutical industry, 
efforts were channelled towards exploring alternative methods to 
preserve and prolong the “lifecycle management” of the production 
process of pharmaceutical medicines beyond the standards of the 
TRIPS Agreement. 
Although many developing countries were hoping that in 
exchange for the TRIPS Agreement they would gain concessions in 
other fields including market access and agricultural subsidies and 
therefore cut their losses short, little has been achieved on that front. 
Not only this, in fact TRIPS failed to achieve stability in the global 
regulation of intellectual property rights. This is attributed to the fact 
that it adopts a “minimum standards” of protection approach, which 
means higher levels of protection are tolerated if countries opted to 
do so.183 
Following the introduction of the TRIPS Agreement, developed 
countries embarked on a process of pushing for even higher levels of 
protection beyond those stipulated under the TRIPS Agreement 
through a number of trading arrangements.184 Preferential trade 
agreements (“PTAs”) embodying bilateral and regional free trade 
 
 182.  Velásquez, supra note 36, at 19. 
 183.  See JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO 
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2003). 
 184.  See generally Peter Drahos, Developing Countries and International 
Intellectual Property Standard-setting, 5 J. WORLD. INTELL. PROP. 765, 783 (2002) 
(“There is not much that developing countries can do about U.S. and EU 
bilateralism on intellectual property.”); Mohammed El-Said, From TRIPS-minus to 
TRIPS to TRIPS-plus: Implications of IPRs for the Arab World, 8 J. WORLD 
INTELL. PROP. 53 (2005) (discussing the impact in Arab states of developed 
countries’ push for stricter intellectual property regulation). 
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agreements (“FTAs”), and other plurilateral arrangements resulted in 
the introduction of additional levels of intellectual property 
protection, a phenomenon which became to be known as TRIPS-
Plus.185 
For the pharmaceutical industry, the proposed changes to the 
global intellectual property regime meant taking the lead in 
advocating the strengthening and prolonging of the term of patent 
protection, resulting in additional monopoly years. Maintaining 
higher prices of medicines provided pharmaceutical producers with 
an opportunity to maintain their market dominance and annual 
profits through evergreening.186 In a recent co-op, Nobel Prize 
laureate Paul Krugman explains with relation to the recently signed 
Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (“TPP”): 
So why do some parties want this deal so much? Because as with many 
“trade” deals in recent years, the intellectual property aspects are more 
important than the trade aspects. Leaked documents suggest that the US is 
trying to get radically enhanced protection for patents and copyrights; this 
is largely about Hollywood and pharma rather than conventional 
exporters. What do we think about that? Well, we should never forget that 
in a direct sense, protecting intellectual property means creating a 
monopoly – letting the holders of a patent or copyright charge a price for 
something (the use of knowledge) that has a zero social marginal cost. In 
that direct sense this introduces a distortion that makes the world a bit 
poorer.187 
So how do PTAs and FTAs increase intellectual property 
protection levels beyond the TRIPS standards? The objective of 
TRIPS-Plus obligations is to undermine and weaken the remaining 
flexibilities available under the international intellectual property 
regime thus making it more difficult for developing countries to 
utilise such flexibilities. There are a number of areas where this may 
 
 185.  Ermias Tekeste Biadgleng & Jean-Christophe Maur, The Influence of 
Preferential Trade Agreements on the Implementation of Intellectual Property 
Rights in Developing Countries: A First Look 1, 21 (Int’l Ctr. for Trade & 
Sustainable Dev., Issue Paper No. 33, 2011); see also Paul Krugman, TPP at the 
NABE, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Mar. 11, 2015), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2015/03/11/tpp-at-the-nabe/ (discussing the pitfalls of the TPP multilateral trade 
agreement). 
 186.  TPP: Threats to Affordable Medicines, PUB. CITIZEN (Dec. 29, 2015), 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/TPP-IP-Factsheet-December-2015.pdf. 
 187.  Krugman, supra note 185.  
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take place with relevance to patents and public health. These include 
the following: 
- Expanding the scope of pharmaceutical patents and creating new 
drug monopolies: this is achieved through a number of ways such as: 
 - lowering the patentability standards, 
 - requiring patents be available for surgical and treatment methods, 
 and 
 - minor variations on old medicines, new and second uses. 
 - Further extension of protection to biological products which include 
 vaccines, blood and blood components, and gene therapies in addition 
 to other forms of protection. 
- Extension of monopolies by extending patent terms if review at the 
patent office or regulatory authority exceeds a prescribed period of time. 
Such leads to “evergreening.” 
- Risk facilitating patent abuse by requiring countries to condition 
marketing approval on patent status (patent linkage). Under linkage, 
patents, even ones that should not have been granted, block generic 
market entry. 
- Protection and Extension of “data exclusivity”: by providing at least 
5 years exclusivity for information related to new products and 3 more in 
cases of new uses for old medicines – even when that information is 
disclosed and available in the public domain. 
- Prohibition/restriction pre-grant oppositions – forbid challenges to 
weak or invalid patents until after they have been granted. 
- Regulate the decisions to reimburse new drugs, and give drug 
companies new rights to challenge decisions on reimbursements if not 
favourable as currently proposed under the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP). 
- Require new forms of intellectual property enforcement–grant: 
customs detaining shipments, including in-transit shipments, suspected of 
non-criminal trademark/copyright/patent infringements; require 
mandatory injunctions for alleged intellectual property infringements; 
raise damages amounts, etc.188 
There has been growing concern over the impact of recent TRIPS-
Plus agreements on public health and access to medicines, in 
particular the ongoing negotiations on the TPP and Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (“TTIP”).189 One of the major 
 
 188.  See EL SAID, PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 134, at 125-96. 
 189.  Id.; see, e.g., Phillip Inman, UN Calls for Suspension of TTIP Talks Over 
Fears of Human Rights Abuses, Guardian (May 4, 2015), 
http://www.theguardian.com/global/2015/may/04/ttip-united-nations-human-right-
secret-courts-multinationals (raising concerns that TTIP gives too much power to 
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concerns about the process of negotiating these agreements is the 
evident lack of transparency and public consultation.190 Stiglitz urged 
the United States government by stating: 
Powerful companies appear to have been given influence over the 
proceedings, even as full access is withheld from many government 
officials from the partnership countries. . . . [T]he T.P.P. could block 
cheaper generic drugs from the market. Big Pharma’s profits would rise, 
at the expense of the health of patients and the budgets of consumers and 
governments. . . . We can’t be sure which of these features have made it 
through this week’s negotiations. What’s clear is that the overall thrust of 
the intellectual property section of the T.P.P. is for less competition and 
higher drug prices. The effects will go beyond the 12 T.P.P. countries. 
Barriers to generics in the Pacific will put pressure on producers of such 
drugs in other countries, like India, as well.191 
The discussion surrounding the negative impact of the above 
TRIPS-Plus rules is not a theoretical one. The negative impact of 
TRIPS-Plus rules could be seen in accordance with emerging 
evidence from many parts of the world. Following are some 
examples in the area of public health. 
Data exclusivity has been one of the most controversial issues in 
recent years because of its direct impact on access to medicines in 
many countries. A form of protection, data exclusivity restricts the 
use of clinical test data on pharmaceutical products by national drug 
regulatory authorities for the approval of generic medicines for a 
certain period of time.192 In addition, data exclusivity protection 
prevents generic producers from relying on such data in the course of 
establishing the efficacy and safety of their products, in some cases 
 
multinational corporations, undermining democracy and rule of law). 
 190.  See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski, Don’t Keep the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Talks Secret, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/14/ 
opinion/dont-keep-trade-talks-secret.html (noting that free trade agreements have 
implications far beyond “imports, tariffs or overseas jobs” and that the TPP’s 
secretive negotiation process only involves industry insiders while excluding the 
general public). 
 191.  Joseph E. Stiglitz, Don’t Trade Away Our Health, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/31/opinion/dont-trade-away-our-
health.html?_r=2. 
 192.  Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial Data in 
International Intellectual Property Law: The Case for a Public Goods Approach, 
13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2009). 
  
412 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [31:3 
effectively requiring unethical and expensive repetition of clinical 
trials hence delaying the entry of generics into the market.193 Data 
exclusivity may apply even if no patent protection exists and may 
also curb the exercise of compulsory licensing.194 In fact, some have 
argued that where available, pharmaceutical producers may even 
favour obtaining data exclusivity protection to that of patent 
protection.195 Indeed this was evident in the case of Jordan where was 
found that “most pharmaceutical companies have not bothered to 
apply for patent protection for medicines launched onto the 
Jordanian market” but relied on data exclusivity.196 
There are many studies detailing the negative impact of data 
exclusivity.197 The case of Colchicine provides an interesting 
example in this regard. In the United States, the price of this drug, 
which is mainly used  for treatment of gout conditions, has increased  
for more than 5,000% as a result of the introduction of data 
exclusivity protection in 2009.198 This caused some uproar since the 
drug has been known and “been in use for thousands of years and 
costs almost nothing to produce” locally, hence it is neither new nor 
inventive and therefore should not be allowed to be patented or 
granted legal protection.199 As a result of data exclusivity protection, 
however, the U.S. FDA started to accept “clinical data from a one-
week trial of the drug and granted data exclusivity to URL Pharma,” 
which led to the gigantic price increase of Colchicine.200 Chakrabarti 
 
 193.  Bryan Mercurio, TRIPS-Plus Provisions in FTAs: Recent Trends, in 
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AND THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 215, 227 (Lorand 
Bartels & Federico Ortino eds., 2006) (“[A] generic manufacturer wishing to 
market and distribute a generic whilst the period of data exclusivity is in force 
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 194.  EL SAID, PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 134, at 140; Kapczynski et al., supra 
note 114, at 2. 
 195.  EL SAID, PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 134, at 139. 
 196.  Rohit Malpani, All Costs, No Benefits: How TRIPS-Plus Intellectual 
Property Rules in the US-Jordan FTA Affect Access to Medicines 7 (Oxfam Int’l, 
Briefing Paper No. 102, 2007). 
 197.  See EL SAID, PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 134, at 133-43. 
 198.  Gargi Chakrabarti, Need of Data Exclusivity: Impact on Access to 
Medicine, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS 325, 332 (2014). 
 199.  Id. (noting that generic formulations of Colchicine were widely available 
for a significant time in the market). 
 200.  Id. 
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explains, “URL Pharma subsequently sued to force other 
manufactures off the market, and raised prices from US$ 0.09 to 4.85 
per pill.”201 
The case of Guatemala is also interesting in this context. A study 
examined the availability of certain drugs in Guatemala and found 
that as a result of the signing of the Central American Free Trade 
Agreement (“CAFTA”), “intellectual property rules reduced access 
to some generic drugs already on the market and delayed new entry 
of other generics.”202 Even worse, the study found that some drugs 
protected from competition in Guatemala will become available in 
the U.S. market for generic competition even before generic versions 
will be legally available in Guatemala.203 The CAFTA impact is also 
felt in other countries: 
[A] 2009 study commissioned by ICTSD concluded that the CAFTA-DR 
would lead to an annual price increase for active ingredients in Costa Rica 
of between 18 per cent and 40 per cent by 2030, requiring increased 
public spending in the range of US$ 2 million to US$ 3.357 million. The 
strongest repercussions were expected from standards on patentability 
criteria and standards on test data exclusivity.204 
Another study cited by Chakrabrti determined that once 
Guatemala enacted data exclusivity protection, prices of some 
medicine increased as much as 846% even though just a small 
number of them were protected by a patent.205 
Jordan also provides an interesting case study in this area. The 
U.S.-Jordan FTA signed in 2001 was the first FTA to include a 
detailed intellectual property chapter which contains many TRIPS-
 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Ellen R. Shaffer & Joseph E. Brenner, A Trade Agreement’s Impact On 
Access To Generic Drugs, 28 HEALTH AFF. w957, w957 (2009). 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Bartels et al., supra note 94, at 190. 
 205.  Chakrabarti, supra note 198, at 332; see also Shaffer & Brenner, supra 
note 202, at w962 (“In each case, the data-protected drugs are much more 
expensive than non-protected drugs in the same therapeutic class. For example, the 
insulin Lantus costs 846 percent more than Isophane insulin; the antifungal Vfend 
costs 810 percent more than the non-data-protected amphotericin B; and the 
intravenous antibiotic Invanz costs 342 percent more than the non-data-protected 
Meropenem (Meronem).”). 
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Plus obligations.206 With relation to data exclusivity, the FTA 
provided for five years of data protection plus three years for new 
uses of known compounds and patent linkage notification.207 In 2007, 
Oxfam conducted a study on the impact of the FTA on the country 
and found some alarming results.208 The study found that since 2001 
medicine prices in Jordan have increased by 20% (this led to price 
increases between two and ten-fold for key medicines to treat 
cardiovascular disease and cancer), and data protection has delayed 
generic entry for 79% of medicines newly launched between 2002 
and 2006.209 The study estimates that the availability of generic 
equivalents would have reduced Jordan’s expenditure on medicines 
by between $6.3 and $22 million between mid-2002 and 2006.210 The 
study draws some comparisons with the situation of Egypt which has 
also implemented TRIPS but not TRIPS-plus obligations. In 
comparison to Egypt, medicine prices are between two and six times 
higher in Jordan.211 A more recent study on the same case by Abbott 
et al. also affirmed the same results and found that between 1999 and 
2004, there was a 17% increase in total medicines expenditure in 
Jordan.212 Compared to the Oxfam study, Abbott et al. found a loss of 
$18 million in 2004—larger than the additional outlays of between 
$6 and $22 million between 2002 and 2006 found in the Oxfam 
study.213 Abbott et al. concluded that the provisions for data 
protection arising from the FTA had the most significant effect on 
the price of medicines on Jordan.214 
The negative impact of TRIPS-Plus rules is not confined to data 
exclusivity or to developing countries. For example, it is believed 
that the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (“CETA”) 
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between the European Union and Canada will result in the rise of 
medicines prices by “[c]ommitting Canada to creating a new system 
of patent term restoration thereby delaying entry of generic 
medicines by a period up to two years.”215 This will also reaffirm 
Canada’s current term of data protection, and will create additional 
barriers for future governments in case they decided to change the 
system nationally (which is of course the same danger applying to all 
countries accepting TRIPS-Plus obligations through international 
agreements).216 Strikingly, “CETA will only affect intellectual 
property rights in Canada—not the EU,” as the latter already applies 
most of the agreement’s standards. “This analysis estimates that 
CETA’s provisions will increase Canadian drug costs by between 
6.2% and 12.9% starting in 2023.”217 In attempting to reduce the 
impact, the “Canadian government committed to compensating 
provinces for the rise in costs for their public drug plans.”218 The 
analysis projected that CETA would delay the generics entry by 3.46 
years on average and the annual loss for each additional year would 
be $811 million, which leads to another burden cost of $2.8 billion 
per year.219 
In the highly ongoing controversial negotiations of the TPP, the 
United States has proposed expanded patent protections standards 
that will likely impact the affordability and accessibility of medicines 
in all TPP partners.220 Further extension of protection to biological 
products which include vaccines, blood and blood components, and 
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gene therapies in addition to other forms of protection is also 
proposed under the TPP.221 Fears about the impact on poorer 
countries of the TPP are mounting. In this regard, Vietnam has the 
lowest GDP per capita of the twelve countries participating in the 
TPP negotiations.222 One study analysed the potential impact of the 
proposed patent regime under the TPP on access to ARVs in 
Vietnam and found that “82% of the HIV population eligible for 
treatment would receive ARVs” if the country utilised the TRIPS 
flexibilities, “while only 30% of Vietnam’s eligible HIV patients 
would have access to ARVs under the US 2014 TPP proposals – 
more than halving the proportion treated compared to the current 
68%” receiving treatment.223 Similar price impacts can be expected 
for other countries participating in the TPP, though these are less 
economically vulnerable than Vietnam.224 
Moreover, a perspective study by E.U.–Colombia FTA IFARMA 
commissioned by Health Action International Europe found that by 
2030, patent-term extensions could increase expenditure on 
medicines in Colombia by nearly $280 million; data-exclusivity rules 
could result in an increase of more than $340 million.225 Another 
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cited the effects of the first decade of data exclusivity protection 
between 2003 and 2011 to cost the public health system 
approximately $1.3 million “on drugs protected with data 
exclusivity.”226 When compared with the cost of the same drugs 
under competitive market conditions, it is estimated that data 
exclusivity cost the healthcare system nearly $400 million dollars 
during that period.227 A sum which would have allowed the state to 
cover the annual health insurance costs of about 146,000 Columbian 
citizens.228 A similar 2009 study for the Dominican Republic 
predicted a modest price increase of 9% to 15% for active 
ingredients by 2027.229 It found that the strongest impact by far was 
to be expected from provisions on data exclusivity.230 A perspective 
study on the impact of the U.S.-Thailand FTA University of 
Bangkok adopting a macro-economic model measuring the impact of 
data exclusivity and patent extension proposals forecasted that all 
scenarios demonstrated a negative impact on the pharmaceutical 
market and access to medicines.231 Medicines prices would increase 
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 226.  César Rodriguez-Garavito, A Golden Straitjacket? The Struggle over 
Patents and Access to Medicines in Colombia, in BALANCING WEALTH AND 
HEALTH: THE BATTLE OVER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 
IN LATIN AMERICA 169, 185 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & César Rodríguez-Garavito 
eds., 2014). 
 227.  Id. at 185. 
 228.  MIGUEL ERNESTO CORTÉS GAMBA ET AL., IMPACTO DE 10 AÑOS DE 
PROTECCIÓN DE DATOS EN MEDICAMENTOS EN COLOMBIA 9 (2012).  
 229.  MAGDALENA RATHE ET AL., MEDICAMENTOS Y PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL, 
EVALUCIÓN DEL IMPACTO DE LOS NUEVOS ESTÁNDARES DE DERECHOS DE 
PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL EN EL PRECIO DE LOS MEDICAMENTOS: EL CASO DE LA 
REPÚBLICA DOMINICANA v (2009).  
 230.  Id. at 62 (finding that data exclusivity is the principal cause of the increase 
in price of pharmaceuticals in the Dominican Republic due to the FTA). 
 231.  Nusaraporn Kessomboon et al., Impact on Access to Medicines from Trips-
Plus: A Case Study of Thai-US FTA, 41 SOUTHEAST ASIAN J. TROPICAL MED. & 
PUB. HEALTH 667, 674 (2010) (alleging that from 2008 to 2023 the impact of data 
exclusivity provisions on pharmaceutical expenditures would amount to $3,713 
million and that of patent extensions would be $4,049 million).  
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by 32% and the domestic pharmaceutical market would contract by 
$3.3 million by 2027.232 
Finally, Australia also was not immune from the negative impact 
of TRIPS-Plus rules arising from its FTA with the United States.233 A 
study found: 
At the time that the EOT [extension of the term] was introduced, the 
annual cost to the Pharmaceutical Benefit Scheme (PBS) was estimated to 
grow from $6 million in 2001-02 to $160 million in 2005-06. This cost 
arises because there is a delayed entry to the PBS of cheaper generic 
drugs. The estimate for 2012-13 is around $240 million in the medium 
term and, in today’s dollars, around $480 million in the longer term. The 
total cost of the EOT to Australia is actually about 20 per cent more than 
this, because the PBS is only one source of revenue for the industry.234 
There have been many calls upon developing countries to refrain 
from introducing TRIPS-Plus commitments under their national law. 
Most recently, the World Medical Association’s Council passed a 
Resolution in its 200th session in April 2015.235 The Resolution 
makes a number of recommendations for countries particularly to: 
Oppose any trade agreement provisions that would compromise 
access to health care services or medicines including but not limited 
to: 
- Patenting (or patent enforcement) of diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical 
techniques; 
- “Evergreening,” or patent protection for minor modifications of existing 
drugs; 
- Patent linkage or other patent term adjustments that serve to as a barrier 
to generic entry into the market; 
- Data exclusivity for biologics; 
- Any effort to undermine TRIPS safeguards or restrict TRIPS flexibilities 
including compulsory licensing; 
 
 232.  Id. at 667.  
 233.  HARRIS ET AL., supra note 9, at vi (noting that as a result of signing the 
Australia-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, Australia extended pharmaceutical patent 
protection beyond the existing twenty year period).  
 234.  Id. at vii-viii.  
 235.  WMA Council Resolution on Trade Agreements and Public Health, 
WORLD MED. ASS’N (Apr. 2015), http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/ 
10policies/30council/cr_20/.  
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- Limits on clinical trial data transparency236 
VI. CURBING TRIPS-PLUS THROUGH NATIONAL 
POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES 
There is now a wealth of evidence widely available about the 
negative impact arising from various TRIPS-Plus obligations 
compared to just few years ago. There has been much less study, 
however, about the actual implementation of TRIPS-Plus obligations 
under the national law of those countries which undertook such 
commitments (from both developing and developed countries).237 
The legal recommendation that developing and least developed 
countries should in fact resist the acceptance and incorporation of 
TRIPS-Plus obligations under their national legal frameworks 
remains valid. Both developing and developed countries have in fact 
attempted to curb and limit the negative impact of TRIPS-Plus rules 
through creative legal and institutional implementation under their 
national regime. 
One important point to stress is the realization that the successful 
implementation at the national level of polices curtailing TRIPS-Plus 
obligations will not take place automatically. In other words, there 
will have to be a concerted national meaningful effort and holistic 
approach (preferably a national programme or policy) whose main 
goal is to ensure collaboration between all concerned stakeholders in 
order to achieve that objective. It is also important to think outside 
the intellectual property box when such initiatives are adopted by 
also looking at competition law for example. 
Although TRIPS-Plus rules may have negative impacts, few 
attempted to see how many countries transposed these TRIPS-Plus 
rules under their national law in a manner which may curtail their 
negative effect. This part will attempt to provide a number of 
examples where countries have succeeded in limiting the negative 
impact of TRIPS-Plus obligations during the implementation phase 
in their national intellectual property regimes. 
Chile provides an interesting example of a developing country that 
attempted to limit the impact of TRIPS-Plus commitments under its 
 
 236.  Id.  
 237.  DEERE, supra note 18, at 21.  
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national law arising from the signed FTA with the United States in 
2006.238 After the agreement signing, public debate about the 
negative impact arose.239 One area of concern was related to data 
exclusivity and patent linkage, which were incorporated under the 
FTA.240 For instance, María Angélica Sánchez of the Industrial 
Association of Pharmaceutical Laboratories argued: 
[I]f our already robust present legislation is expanded to establish so-
called linkage, and is modified to include the protection of clinical trial 
data, we must be prepared as a country for prices of medications to 
increase considerably. In accordance with the last study undertaken by the 
School of Economics at the University of Chile, prices will increase by 75 
percent, which will have a considerable influence on the treatment of 
illnesses under the AUGE [Chile’s Universal Access Plan] and other 
common illnesses in the country.241 
In dealing with the situation and following extensive public 
debate, Chile limited the availability of data protection under its 
national law to those pharmaceutical products that have been 
marketed in the national territory in the year after the grant of 
marketing approval and therefore if the drug was not marketed 
within a year, the test data submitted for approval purposes will not 
be protected.242 The rationale behind such a requirement is to 
encourage early registration of drugs after first registration abroad, so 
that the period of protection for the pharmaceutical test data starts 
early.243 In addition, the law excluded several elements from the 
 
 238.  Salvador Millaleo H., Chile: The Case of IP Opposition from 
Predominantly Private Interests, in BALANCING WEALTH AND HEALTH: THE 
BATTLE OVER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES IN LATIN 
AMERICA (Rochelle Dreyfuss & César Rodríguez-Garavit eds., 2014).  
 239.  Id.  
 240.  Id.  
 241.  Id.   
 242.  Law No. 19,039 art. 90, septiembre 30, 1991, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] 
(Chile) (modified on December 1, 2005 by Law 19,996, which classifies active 
ingredients as new chemical entities if they have not been marketed in the country 
prior to the health registration or authorization application); accord Biadgleng & 
Maur, supra note 185, at 20 (observing that El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua appear to have introduced similar 
legislation).   
 243.  See, e.g., Law of Ukraine On Medicines, Implemented by Verhovna Rada 
Resolution No. 124/96-BP, art. 9, Mar. 4, 1996 (Ukr.) (mandating that 
pharmaceutical companies seeking data exclusivity submit an application for 
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scope of protection. Accordingly, article 91 of the Chilean law states: 
The protection of this Paragraph shall not apply when: 
(a) The owner of the test data referred to in Article 89 has engaged in 
forms of conduct or practices declared as contrary to free competition in 
direct relation to the use or exploitation of that information, according to 
the final decision of the free competition court. 
(b) For reasons of public health, national security, non-commercial public 
use, national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency 
declared by the competent authority, ending the protection referred to in 
Article 89 shall be justified. 
(c) The pharmaceutical or chemical-agricultural product is the subject of a 
compulsory license, according to what is established in this Law. 
(d) The pharmaceutical or chemical-agricultural product has not been 
marketed in the national territory after 12 months from the health 
certificate or clearance granted in Chile. 
(e) The pharmaceutical or chemical-agricultural product has a health 
certificate or clearance abroad that has been in force for over 12 
months.244 
Although the negative impact of data exclusivity is not totally 
eradicated as a result of the introduction of these provisions, one can 
argue that the creative implementation approach taken by Chilean 
legislature has in fact considerably limited the negative impact of 
such provisions.245 
Peru provides another example of a developing country in this 
context. Its Legislative Decree No. 1072 for the Protection of 
Undisclosed Test Data or Other Undisclosed Data Related to 
Pharmaceutical Products implemented some flexibility by broadly 
 
medicine registration within two years after the first registration of the medicine 
anywhere in the world in order to encourage companies to launch medicines in 
Ukraine as soon as possible).  
 244.  See Pedro Roffe, Intellectual Property Provisions in Bilateral and Regional 
Trade Agreements: The Challenges of Implementation 15 (Oct. 6, 2006) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Center for International Environmental 
Law) (citing Decree No. 153 art. 91, Mechanisms for the Protection of 
Undisclosed Data, Julio 20, 2005, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] (Chile)).  
 245.  Millaleo H., supra note 238, at 151 (“However, the text of the FTA and 
Law No. 20.160 did not speak to either issue. The text of the FTA section 
regarding patents and medical products omitted several other topics of interest to 
the United States, such as procedural issues, the question of parallel importation, 
and the availability of second-use patents.”).  
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providing a definition of the concept of “new chemical entities” in 
great detail, which could potentially provide more policy space when 
interpreted.246 Moreover, the Decree provides that in cases where the 
submission of undisclosed test data is “necessary to determine the 
safety and efficiency of such product,” the authorities will protect 
such data if “generating it has involved considerable efforts.”247 
Other modifications introduced in 2009 also provide some policy 
space to be interpreted under the public health approach.248 The 
Decree further allows the five-year term of data exclusivity 
protection to start concurrently from the date the product is approved 
in other countries with high sanitary monitoring or approval 
regime.249 
Regarding the issue of patent linkage, Colombia implemented the 
FTA with the United States creatively by requiring Invima (the 
agency responsible for evaluating drug safety and efficacy) to keep a 
public record of new applications rather than proactively warning 
patent holders of applications that may impinge on their rights.250 
Other developed countries are also exercising caution when it comes 
to dealing with TRIPS-Plus conditions under their national 
legislations. Two developed countries stand out in this regard: 
Canada and Australia. 
Canada has been active in perusing an international TRIPS-Plus 
agenda through its participation in a number of international TRIPS-
Plus arrangements including the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement, TPP, and the bilateral agreement with the European 
Union.251 However, national debate about the need to cater to the 
health of citizens has concurrently taken the centre stage. For 
 
 246.  See Legislative Decree No. 1072, modified by Law No. 29316, enero 14, 
2009, art. 2 (Peru) (defining “new chemical entity” and providing guidance on 
what will not be considered a new chemical entity). 
 247.  Id. art. 1. 
 248.  See id. art. 4 (dictating exceptions and limits to the right to protection of 
data on the grounds of protecting public health).  
 249.  See id. art. 3.  
 250.  See the Decree 733 of 2012. For more on implementation by Columbia of 
its FTA see César Rodríguez-Garavito, A Golden Straitjacket? The Struggle over 
Patents and Access to Medicines in Colombia, in BALANCING WEALTH AND 
HEALTH: THE BATTLE OVER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 
IN LATIN AMERICA (Rochelle Dreyfuss & César Rodríguez-Garavit (eds) (2014).  
 251.  Roffe, supra note 244.  
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instance, the Commission on the Future of Health Care established 
by the Prime Minister in 2002 highlighted its concern about the 
practice of evergreening stating that it “delays the ability of generic 
manufacturers to develop cheaper products for the marketplace and it 
is a questionable outcome of Canada’s patent law.”252 
The country had taken some measures to limit evergreening even 
before the Commission issued its report. In 1993, the country 
introduced the Notice of Compliance Regulations (“NOC”).253 
According to the NOC, the Minister of Health has to keep a Patent 
Register which contains the patents informed by innovator 
companies in respect of drugs for which marketing approval is 
sought.254 In 2006, in an attempt to “strike a balance between 
effective protection of pharmaceuticals inventions, in order to 
stimulate research and development (R&D), and keeping the costs of 
medicines down,” the government adopted measures aimed at 
preventing the use of evergreening patents.255 The new NOC, 
therefore, prevents an innovator company from obtaining an order to 
prohibit the registration of a generic product for a period of twenty-
four months as otherwise allowed by the Canadian regulations, for 
patents listed after a generic company submits an application for 
approval of its product.256 The new regulations also make it clear that 
patents covering matters without direct therapeutic application, such 
as processes or intermediates, cannot be used to delay the marketing 
approval of generics.257 
The Canadian judiciary also showed concern about the 
proliferation of patents in a number of decisions. In AstraZeneca 
 
 252.  ROY J. ROMANOW, COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE IN 
CANADA, BUILDING ON VALUES: THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE IN CANADA 209 
(2002).  
 253.  See Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations (Patent Act), 
SOR/93-133 (Can.).  
 254.  See Donald M. Cameron et al., Canadian Drug Patent Laws and 
Regulations, in CAMERON’S PATENT AND TRADE SECRETS LAW 9 (Donald M. 
Cameron ed., 2010), http://www.jurisdiction.com/patweb09.pdf.  
 255.  DOMINIQUE VALIQUET, LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT, PRB 06-14E, THE 
PATENTED MEDICINES (NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE) REGULATIONS 1 (2006); see 
Regulations Amending the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) 
Regulations, C. Gaz. Part II, Vol. 140, No. 21, 1503-25 (Can.).  
 256.  Cameron et al., supra note 254, at 9.  
 257.  Id. at 13-15.  
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Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health),258 the Supreme Court of 
Canada acknowledged: 
Given the evident (and entirely understandable) commercial strategy of 
the innovative drug companies to evergreen their products by adding bells 
and whistles to a pioneering product even after the original patent for that 
pioneering product has expired, the decision of the Federal Court of 
Appeal would reward evergreening even if the generic manufacturer (and 
thus the public) does not thereby derive any benefit from the subsequently 
listed patents.259 
Moreover, various Canadian courts started to apply a judicial 
interpretation to the utility requirement. This has led to the 
invalidation of a number of pharmaceutical patents in the country. As 
Ho explains: 
[I]f a patent or patent application “promises” a certain result, such as 
fewer side effects, evidence of that promise, such as data establishing 
fewer side effects, must be disclosed or “soundly predicted” in the patent 
to satisfy utility pursuant to the “promise doctrine.” If there is no promise, 
only a scintilla of utility is required.260 
Although the Canadian approach to interpreting what is “useful” 
differs from other countries’ interpretation, it is widely 
acknowledged that a patent should only be granted when the inventor 
has provided enough benefit to society.261 Interestingly, the first 
Supreme Court of Canada case to apply this doctrine did so in the 
 
 258.  2006 SCC 49 (Can.). 
 259.  Id. para. 39; see also Apotex Inc. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc., 2008 
SCC 61, paras. 97-98 (Can.) (conveying concern over the use of evergreening for 
the extension of data exclusivity periods but claiming that the concern over 
evergreening is an insufficient basis for attacking the selection of patents doctrine). 
See generally Correa, Guidelines, supra note 36, at 9, 16 (describing specific 
mechanisms that enable the evergreening of pharmaceutical patents, such as 
patents on salts and the exploitation of enantiomers).  
 260.  Ho, supra note 42, at 328-29.  
 261.  See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535 (1966) (“[T]he decisions of the 
[Court of Customs and Patent Appeals] are in accord with the view that a product 
may not be patented absent a showing of utility . . . .”); cf. John Lechleiter, How 
Lax Patent Rules in Canada are Suffocating Life-Saving Innovation, FORBES (Aug. 
26, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnlechleiter/2013/08/26/how-lax-patent-
rules-in-canada-are-suffocating-life-saving-innovation/#5b8c11dc4dff (critiquing 
the “Promise of the Patent Doctrine” as arbitrary and detrimental to the Canadian 
biopharmaceutical industry).  
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context of an invention on a new use of a known compound—the use 
of AZT to treat HIV/AIDS.262 This is a case that might have been 
barred at a much earlier stage with less cost to society by adopting a 
model similar to India’s section 3(d) statute, which prohibits not only 
new variations without increased efficacy, but new uses.263 
Perhaps there is no other developed country which went as far as 
Australia in attempting to deal with the negative impact of TRIPS-
Plus rules. Having seen its public health situation negatively 
implicated by the signing of the FTA with the United States, 
discussion ensued nationally about the need to curtail the negative 
impact arising from the FTA.264 A 2013 report summarizes the 
current challenges facing the regime in the country by stating: 
Australia’s patent system has allowed and will continue for some time to 
allow patents to be granted which would not be granted elsewhere; it has 
awarded a longer effective patent life than is provided in the United States 
or than seems necessary to underpin drug development in Australia; it has 
allowed patents to expire later in Australia than in its major trading 
partners. All of this has limited the generic manufacturing base, 
employment and exports and it has increased Australia’s pharmaceutical 
costs. The Raising the Bar Act which recently came into force may 
moderate this, but its efficacy will not be evident for some years, and 
there is the prospect that, even with the changes introduced by Raising the 
Bar, patent standards are still insufficient to moderate evergreening in the 
pharmaceutical industry.265 
Nevertheless and following the signing of the FTA with the United 
States in 2006, Australia introduced a number of reforms aimed 
primarily towards limiting the impact of TRIPS-Plus commitments 
arising from the FTA.266 For instance, the FTA included obligations 
related to the extension of patent duration to compensate delays 
during marketing approval.267 During the implementation phase, the 
 
 262.  See Apotex Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation Ltd., 2002 SCC 77, paras. 77, 
80-83 (Can.). 
 263.  See Chatterjee, Novartis, supra note 169.  
 264.  See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 9, at 120-21.  
 265.  Id. at xiv.  
 266.  Id. at 118.  
 267.  See Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-U.S., art. 
17.9.8(b), May 18, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 1248 [hereinafter Austl.-U.S. FTA] (“[E]ach 
Party shall make available an adjustment of the patent term to compensate the 
patent owner for unreasonable curtailment of the effective patent term as a result of 
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country limited the negative impact arising from patent term 
extension by further confining such type of extensions to certain and 
specific categories of products.268 Moreover, the Australian patent 
law imposes additional substantive conditions specifically applicable 
for the extension of patent duration for “pharmaceutical 
substances.”269 Based on this, the extension of the term is possible 
only if the following conditions are met: 
i) the patent claim contains at least one “pharmaceutical substance per 
se”; 
ii) that the product is included in the Australian Register of Therapeutic 
Goods; and 
iii) marketing approval was issued less than five years after the filing of 
the patent.270 
Moreover and in order to widen the available national policy 
space, the 1990 Patents Act also includes dedicated procedures for 
the opposition against patent term extension.271 In addition to these 
measures, the 1990 Patents Act imposes additional limitations on 
patent rights during the extended period of protection. For instance, 
article 78 states: 
If the Commissioner grants an extension of the term of a standard patent, 
the exclusive rights of the patentee during the term of the extension are 
not infringed: 
(a) by a person exploiting: 
 (i) a pharmaceutical substance per se that is in substance disclosed in 
 the complete specification of the patent and in substance falls within 
 the scope of the claim or claims of that specification; or 
 (ii) a pharmaceutical substance when produced by a process that 
 involves the use of recombinant DNA technology, that is in substance 
 
the marketing approval process.”). 
 268.  See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 9, at ix, 93-97 (indicating that unlike the 
United States, Europe, United Kingdom, and Japan, Australia limits extensions 
only to patents claiming new active ingredients or formulation).  
 269.  Id. at 40, 101.  
 270.  See Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ch 6 pt 3 s 70 sub-divs (2)-(3) (Austl.).  
 271.  See id. s 75 sub-divs (1)-(4); see also Austl.-U.S. FTA, supra note 267, art. 
17.9.8(b) n.17-50 (declaring that the term “pharmaceutical substance” is 
synonymous to “pharmaceutical product,” thereby allowing Australia to preserve 
its rules on eligibility for extension of patent terms to compensate for delays in the 
marketing authorization process).  
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 disclosed in the complete specification of the patent and in substance 
 falls within the scope of the claim or claims of that specification; for a 
 purpose other than therapeutic use; or 
(b) by a person exploiting any form of the invention other than: 
 (i) a pharmaceutical substance per se that is in substance disclosed in 
 the complete specification of the patent and in substance falls within 
 the scope of the claim or claims of that specification; or 
 (ii) a pharmaceutical substance when produced by a process that 
 involves the use of recombinant DNA technology, that is in substance 
 disclosed in the complete specification of the patent and in substance 
 falls within the scope of the claim or claims of that specification.272 
Despite the above measures, some argue that the government did 
not go far enough in limiting the negative impact arising from 
TRIPS-Plus rules.273 The 2013 Pharmaceutical Patents Review 
Report further recommends that there is a “need for an external body, 
the Patent Oversight Committee, to audit the patent grant processes 
to help ensure these new standards are achieved, and to monitor 
whether they inhibit the patenting of follow-on pharmaceuticals 
which promote evergreening with no material therapeutic benefit.”274 
In addition, it stated that “[t]he Government should also review the 
effectiveness of the patent scheme when the impact of Raising the 
Bar Act has become clear.”275 Moreover, one of the report’s authors 
went as far as recommending the shortening of the patent life from 
fifteen years to twelve years.276 According to the author, the 
estimated savings resulting from this reduction is $130 million a 
year.277 Furthermore, “if a 70% price reduction from generic entry 
was achieved as discussed above, the savings would be 
approximately $260 million a year.”278 
In supplementing the legislative framework, the Australian Patent 
Office also became more assertive in rejecting requests/applications 
to extend the duration of patent protection in cases where it 
determined that the innovation in the patent claim did not involve the 
pharmaceutical substance per se, including the claims where the 
 
 272.  Patents Act 1990, ch 6 pt 3 s 78.  
 273.  See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 9, at 119.  
 274.  Id. at xi.  
 275.  Id.  
 276.  Id. at xv, 84.  
 277.  Id. at 84-85.  
 278.  Id. at 85.  
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patent was primarily related to the arrangement of pharmaceutical 
substances; a new method of delivery of a known substance or to the 
use or method of producing a substance.279 
It is worth noting that the above referred to examples do not 
emanate from separate national initiatives but rather as a part of a 
more comprehensive approach dealing with public health challenges 
within these countries. This demonstrates that many developed 
countries acknowledge today the negative consequences to TRIPS-
Plus rules on public health. At the same time, few developing 
countries seem to take serious notice of such implications. 
Needless to say that there are other approaches currently being 
utilised by developed countries in their fight against evergreening 
and patent proliferation. One of these being considered by the 
European Patent Office (“EPO”) is increasing the fees paid for 
examination and maintenance of patents.280 Some believe that this 
approach would “reduce ‘strategic behaviour’ and the number of 
claims and thereby improve ‘patent quality’, particularly with regard 
to patent ‘thickets’.”281
 
Ecuador is an example of a developing 
country that has implemented a fee increase policy.282 “Examination 
and registration fees, as well as maintenance fees for patents were 
drastically increased recently,
 
elevating the cost of obtaining a patent 
to more than U$S [sic] 100,000, except for certain categories of 
applicants (such as small companies and universities).”283 As Correa 
explains, “[t]hese fees – probably the highest in the world – are 
 
 279.  See id. at 100-01.  
 280.  See Yvonne Johnson, European Patent Fees to Increase, BAKER 
BRETTELL (Jan. 10, 2014), http://barkerbrettell.co.uk/european-patent-fees-to-
increase/; cf. EUR. PATENT OFFICE ECON. & SCI. ADVISORY BD., 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE PATENT SYSTEM 4 (2012) (noting that 
while the Economic & Science Advisory Board does not recommend an overhaul 
of the patent fee system, it does recommend the adoption of more “consistent and 
harmonized fee policies . . . .”).   
 281.  Correa, Tackling, supra note 177, at 21 (citing EUR. PATENT OFFICE ECON. 
& SCI. ADVISORY BD., WORKSHOP ON PATENT THICKETS 12, 16 (2012)); see also 
EUR. PATENT OFFICE ECON. & SCI. ADVISORY BD., supra note 280, at 5 
(explaining that patent thickets refers to a high concentration of patents in a 
particular area, especially those with high market potential).  
 282.  Correa, Tackling, supra note 177, at 21.  
 283.  Id. (citing Resolucíon No. 001-2013 CD-IEPI).  
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likely to substantially reduce the number of patent applications.”284 
Another approach is related to the adoption of opposition 
procedures. Oppositions to pharmaceutical patents are much more 
frequently filed and granted than other types of patents in many 
countries. Emerging evidence estimates that at least 27% of current 
patents would be found invalid by U.S. courts285 while in only thirty-
nine out of 283 cases—where patent validity was questioned before a 
U.S. Federal District Court between 2007 and 2011—the claims that 
were challenged were found to be valid and enforceable.286
 
Other 
studies indicate that “[w]hen generic competitors challenge . . . 
patents, courts find many invalid or not infringed.”287 Studies 
concerning the United States and the European Union found that 
generic companies win nearly three-quarters of cases.288
 
In the 
European Union and according to the EPO, patents on medicines 
were twice as likely to be challenged as other types of patents.289 In 
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(unpublished manuscript) (on file with George Mason University, Department of 
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 286.  Robert Smyth, White Paper Report: United States Patent Invalidity Study 
2012 2 (Sept. 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Morgan Lewis); see, 
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Corkill, 771 F.2d 1496, 1500 (Fed. Cir. 1985)) (finding invalid a patent on 
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degree of unpredictability in the art so long as there was a reasonable probability of 
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 287.  Ho, supra note 42, at 321.  
 288.  See id.; see also FED TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO 
PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY vi (2002) (finding that generic companies 
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finding lack of infringement, and 10% of cases abandoned by the patent owner 
before a judicial finding); Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry, Preliminary Report 188-
89 (Nov. 28, 2008) (working paper) (on file with the Eur. Comm’n) (noting that 
generic companies won more than 60% of all cases, 71% of challenges they 
initiated, and 74% cases involving secondary patents). But see W. Raghupathi, 
Pharmaceutical Patent Validity: An Empirical Study of the Recent Decisions of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (2008-2011) 20 (2011) (working 
paper) (on file with Fordham University) (“The current study finds the net ruling 
of the Federal Circuit to be balanced and nuanced with a nearly equal number of 
affirmations and reversals, among both valid and invalid patents.”).  
 289.  See Correa, Tackling, supra note 177, at 10.  
  
430 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [31:3 
Argentina, it was found that twenty-five patent oppositions were 
submitted by domestic companies including for the HIV medicines 
efavirenz, ritonavir, lopinavir, raltegravir, elvitegravir, and the fixed-
dose combination TDF/FTC/EFV which led to the rejection of many 
opposed patent applications.290 In India, twenty-five out of thirty-four 
oppositions (73.5%) that were filed by local companies or non-
governmental organizations against pharmaceutical patent 
applications filed between 2005 and 2008 resulted in rejections.291 
Driven by these considerations, the America Invents Act that 
amended in 2011 the U.S. Patent Act aimed, inter alia, to boost the 
use of such procedures.292 Among other changes, the United States 
Trademark and Patent Office Director can now institute re-
examination on his own initiative on the basis of prior art cited 
during another re-examination.293 A new proceeding, called “post 
grant review,” was also “introduced to allow more broadly based 
challenges to a patent during . . . the nine months after grant or 
reissue.”294 The aim of these procedures is to be quick, less costly, 
and use more technically trained adjudicators than the U.S. federal 
court system. In addition, in order to encourage applications for 
invalidity, U.S. law awards the first generic company to successfully 
challenge a patent on a drug the right to enjoy a 180-day exclusivity 
period in which no subsequent abbreviated new drug application can 
be approved for that drug.295 
 
 290.  See New Resources from Argentina Now Available on PODB, PAT. 
OPPOSITION DATABASE (May 17, 2013), http://news.patentoppositions.org/ 
post/50651291488/new-resources-from-argentina-now-available-on-podb.  
 291.  See Shamnad Basheer, Patent Oppositions in India: The “Efficacy” of 
Section 3(d), SPICY IP (Sept. 16, 2009), http://spicyip.com/2009/09/patent-
oppositions-in-india-efficacy-of.html (finding that approximately twenty out of the 
twenty-five rejections were based on section 3(d) of the Indian Patent Law, 
indicating the “efficacy” of this controversial section).  
 292.  See Post-Grant Proceedings Against U.S. Patents, LADAS & PARRY LLP, 
http://ladas.com/education-center/post-grant-proceedings/ (last visited Feb. 27, 
2016).  
 293.  See id.  
 294.  Id.  
 295.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(5)(B)(iv) (2012); see also Tony v. Pezzano, United 
States: The Drug Approval Process: What’s the “Hatch” with the One Hundred 
Eighty-Day ANDA Exclusivity Period?, MONDAQ (June 8, 2001), 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/24779/Life+Sciences+Biotechnology/The
+Drug+Approval+Process+Whats+The+Hatch+With+The+One+Hundred+Eighty
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Needless to say that the role of judiciary is also essential in 
restoring the balance. As Okediji explains, “[t]he U.S. Supreme 
Court has creatively interpreted important policy bases for limiting 
patent subject matter eligibility in controversial cases involving new 
technologies.”296 An example of a developing country’s judicial 
involvement can be seen in the Kenyan High Court’s decision in 
Asero Ochieng v. Attorney-General,297 which overturned an anti-
counterfeiting statute (The Anti-Counterfeit Act, No. 13 (2008)). 
This court’s decision, which preserved access to generic medicines, 
found the Act to be unconstitutional because it undermined the 
fundamental human right to health.298 
Institutional creativity also plays an important role in preserving 
the flexibilities of TRIPS, limiting the negative impact of TRIPS-
Plus rules and enhancing access to medicines. The widely cited 
Brazilian practice (prior consent) takes the lead in this regard.299 
Since 1999, applications for pharmaceutical patents must obtain the 
prior consent from the Brazilian National Sanitary Agency (Agência 
Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária, “ANVISA”).300 In accordance with 
 
Day+ANDA+Exclusivity+Period.  
 296.  Okediji, supra note 14, at 18 (citing Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. 
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2116 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. 
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1301 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 
593, 606 (2010)). 
 297.  (2012) Petition No. 409 of 2009 (H.C.K.) (Kenya). 
 298.  See The Anti-Counterfeit Act, No. 13 (2008) KENYA GAZETTE 
SUPPLEMENT NO. 97 §§ 32-34 (granting owners of intellectual property with 
“reasonable cause to suspect” their right is being infringed the right to file a 
complaint); see also Suleiman Mbatiah, Kenya: Pharmaceutical Companies 
Pushing Anti-Counterfeit Law, INTER PRESS SERV. (June 14, 2010), 
http://www.ipsnews.net/2010/06/kenya-pharmaceutical-companies-pushing-anti-
counterfeit-law/.  
 299.  See CTR. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES & DEBATES, supra note 7, at 134. See 
generally Kenneth C. Shadlen, The Rise and Fall of “Prior Consent” in Brazil, 3 
WIPO J. 103, 103 (2011) (examining the development of prior consent and the 
conflicts surrounding its application).  
 300.  CTR. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES & DEBATES, supra note 7, at 130. It became 
mandatory for pharmaceutical patent applications to undergo analysis by ANVISA 
ever since the institution of Provisional Act 2006/1999, which created the prior 
consent mechanism. Prior consent was consolidated by Law no. 10196, of 2001, 
which amended article 229 of the Patent Act—including item C: Article 229-C, 
Patent Act. The granting of patents for pharmaceutical products and processes shall 
depend on the prior consent of the National Sanitary Agency—ANVISA.  
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this, the national system in the country divides the examination of 
pharmaceutical patent applications between two agencies: the 
National Institute of Intellectual Property (“INPI”) and ANVISA.301 
In accordance with this, the INPI is responsible for examining the 
legal sufficiency of patent applications while ANVISA, is a separate 
agency devoted to protecting and promoting “public health” in 
Brazil.302 Under the prior consent law, INPI no longer has the 
authority to grant patents on its own; before doing so, it should 
forward the application to ANVISA for its consent (examination), 
purportedly based on public health considerations.303 There is 
evidence that such a practice has in fact improved the quality of the 
granted patents in the country drastically.304 Through national 
coordination between legislation, patent office action and judicial 
intervention, the country provides valuable lessons to many 
developing countries in the area of public health and access to 
medicines. 
VII. SUPPLEMENTARY MODELS FOR 
INNOVATION IN PUBLIC HEALTH: PAY-FOR-
PERFORMANCE SCHEMES 
The preceding section emphasized the need for countries alike to 
take a pro-active approach in interpreting intellectual property 
commitments under their national laws in a manner which 
maximizes the use of remaining policy space even where TRIPS-
Plus obligations exist. At the same time, there is a need for a broader 
approach that goes beyond the parameters of the intellectual property 
regime. Countries should also indulge and even encourage 
experimentation with other polices and approaches which may also 
 
 301.  See Shadlen, supra note 299, at 104-05.  
 302.  Id.  
 303.  See id. at 107.  
 304.  ANVISA conducted a qualitative analysis of decisions issued after prior 
approval from INPI between 2001 and 2009. The study showed that ANVISA’s 
participation increases the quality of granted patents by preventing approval of 
“inappropriate and frivolous patents.” The study found that, out of the 1,346 patent 
applications analysed in the time period, 119 were denied consent. Of the patent 
applications denied, 47.9% were denied for lack of novelty and 22.7% were denied 
for obviousness. CTR. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES & DEBATES, supra note 7, at 147. 
India also provides an interesting case of a developing country in this field, see 
Basheer, supra note 291.  
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complement the intellectual property regime with the goal of driving 
innovation and improving quality and coverage in the public health 
sector.305 Adoption of new innovative models in the public health 
sector is therefore a necessity to deal with the current and future 
challenges facing humanity.306 This will require the combined efforts 
of national governments, multi-national bodies, and the private 
sector. This will also demand a vision orientation, where 
“[c]ollaboration and partnership, then, may have to take the place of 
profit and competition as the key words in the development of the 
medicines of the future.”307 
A number of global initiatives were launched in recent years308 
including prizes for medical innovation, open source/access drug 
initiatives,309 in addition to new access and innovation models such 
as medicines patent pools,310 the health impact fund (“HIP”),311 “and 
 
 305.  E.g., Paul Grootendorst et al., New Approaches to Rewarding 
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 183 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 681, 681-85 (2011) 
(analysing the limitations of the drug patent system and describing alternatives 
such as public subsidies and funding for research, and impact-based and royalty-
based reward systems).  
 306.  See Jerome H. Reichman, Lecture, Nurturing a Transactional System of 
Innovation, 16 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 143, 162 (2007) (arguing that 
developing countries would benefit from “experimentally . . . testing different 
approaches to stimulating and disseminating innovation in their national and 
regional systems of innovation and to defining the relevant supporting legal 
standards that could prove effective for different players at different levels of 
development”).  
 307.  Anderson, Pharmaceuticals, supra note 45. 
 308.  See generally The Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, 
Innovation and Intellectual Property, WORLD HEALTH ORG., 
http://www.who.int/phi/implementation/phi_globstat_action/en/ (last visited Mar. 
16, 2016) (announcing the WHO comprehensive Global Strategy and Plan of 
Action on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property).  
 309.  See, e.g., Christine Årdal & John-Arne Røttingen, An Open Source 
Business Model for Malaria, PLOS ONE, no. 2, Feb. 6, 2015 (recommending the 
“open source” approach to develop new drugs to fight malaria).   
 310.  See, e.g., Patent Pools: Assessing Their Value-Added to Global Health, 
Policy Brief, RESULTS FOR DEV. INST., http://healthresearchpolicy.org/sites/ 
healthresearchpolicy.org/files/assessments/files/Patent%20Pools%20-%20final 
%20-%20Brief%2020120409.pdf (last visited Mar. 16, 2016) (assessing whether 
patent pools work to speed development of new medicines in low to mid-income 
countries).  
 311.  See Amitava Banerjee et al., The Health Impact Fund: Incentives for 
Improving Access to Medicines, 375 LANCET 166, 166 (2010) (proposing the 
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‘open data pools and prize funds that have been created or 
conceived’”.312 These schemes share one thing in common, dealing 
with the challenge of lack of resources, incentives and funding while 
at the same time improving the quality and coverage of public health 
regime and access to medicines in any country. 
Regional powers have also paid special attention to these 
challenges.313 For example, the European Union declared its 
commitment to explore alternative models and proposals in its 
development, innovation and health policy objectives.314 In 2010, the 
European Council  released conclusions on an EU Role in Global 
Health in response to proposals from the European Commission.315 
As highlighted, this represents the first formal E.U. strategy of its 
type, since previous European agreements on health issues focused 
on more specific areas including AIDS and pandemic diseases.316 
The 2010 E.U. Council Conclusions on Global Health pledged to 
“ensure that innovations and interventions produce products and 
services that are accessible and affordable.”317 The European Union’s 
 
Health Impact Fund “as an enduring reform that would give pharmaceutical 
innovators stable financial incentives to develop new medicines that have large 
effects on global health, and to sell them worldwide at no more than the lowest 
feasible cost of production and distribution”).  
 312.  BLOEMEN ET AL., supra note 27, at 10. Alongside these initiatives there are 
other proposals aimed towards making the pharmaceutical industry more 
accountable and transparent. See Ed Silverman, Angry Over Drug Prices, More 
States Push Bills for Pharma to Disclose Costs, WALL ST. J.: PHARMALOT (Apr. 
24, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/pharmalot/2015/04/24/angryoverdrugpricesmore-
statespushbillsforpharmatodisclosecosts/ (reporting on recent proposed state 
legislation that require full disclosure of costs in order for pharmaceutical 
companies to justify raising prices); Sam Stein, Elizabeth Warren Proposes Big 
Pharma ‘Swear Jar’ to Fund Medical Research, HUFFINGTON POST: HUFFPOST 
POL. (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/22/elizabeth-
warren-pharma_n_6520746.html (describing Senator Elizabeth Warren’s proposed 
Medical Innovation Act that would require pharmaceutical companies to pay into a 
fund when sanctioned by the federal government, which would be used to invest in 
research for the National Institutes of Health and the FDA).  
 313.  See, e.g., Press Release, Council of the European Union, Council 
Conclusions on the EU Role in Global Health 1, 5 (May 10, 2010) (on file with the 
European Commission).  
 314.  See id. at 3.  
 315.  Id. 
 316.  See id. at 4.  
 317.  Id. at 5; see BLOEMEN ET AL., supra note 27, at 11 (“These conclusions call 
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2020 proposal, the Innovation Union,318 “speaks of introducing a 
more ‘open approach to innovation’, ‘increased open access to the 
results of EU financed research’ and the []promotion of ‘patent 
pools’, as well as ‘innovation inducement prizes’.”319 The ensuing 
part will focus specifically on performance-based rewards (“PBR”) 
schemes. In the United States, the Senate asked the National 
Academies in 2012 to consider alternative models based on the 
notion of funding R&D though a combination of expanded 
government grants and subsidies, and new innovation prize funds, 
with the level of the R&D rewards based upon a percentage of GNP 
or health care outlays.320  
VIII. PERFORMANCE-BASED REWARDS 
One of the promising approaches gaining ground in this field is 
related to PBR or pay-for-performance for pharmaceutical 
innovation schemes. “Pay-for-performance” is a wide term which 
encompasses various schemes and programmes “aimed at improving 
the quality, efficiency, reach and overall value and coverage of 
health care.”321 These arrangements offer financial incentives to 
various stakeholders and health care providers to carry out such 
improvements and achieve optimal outcomes/objectives related to 
 
for needs-driven innovation and further exploration of innovation ‘de-linkage 
models.’”).  
 318.  Innovation Union: A Europe 2020 Initiative, EUR. COMM’N, 
http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/index_en.cfm (last updated Oct. 13, 
2015). 
 319.  BLOEMEN ET AL., supra note 27, at 11; see Sophie Bloemen & David 
Hammerstein, Time for the EU to Lead On Innovation: EU Policy Opportunities in 
Biomedical Innovation and the Promotion of Public Knowledge Goods (Apr. 2012) 
(policy paper) (on file with Health Action International Europe) (providing 
descriptions of the policy proposals).  
 320.  See S. 3187, 112th Cong. (2012).  
 321.  Julia James, Pay-for-Performance: New Payment Systems Reward Doctors 
and Hospitals for Improving Quality of Care, but Studies to Date Show Mixed 
Results, HEALTH POL’Y BRIEF, Oct. 11, 2012, at 1, 1. 
http://healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_78.pdf; see 
Pay for Performance – Models, HEALTH CARE INCENTIVES IMPROVEMENT INST., 
http://www.hci3.org/thought-leadership/why-incentives-matter/pay-
performance/pay-performance-models (last visited Mar. 16, 2016) (noting that 
pay-for-performance models all include a performance measurement, incentive 
design, and transparency and consumer engagement).  
  
436 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [31:3 
the health of their patients which may not (either partially or fully) 
have been undertaken otherwise.322 In a nutshell, pay-for-
performance is “a set of performance indicators linked to an 
incentive scheme.”323 
Described by Nathan in 2007 as one of the most promising 
systems in dealing with the problem of affordability and availability 
of medicines, pay-for-performance schemes started to gain more 
ground during the last decade.324 Put simply, PBR’s main objective is 
to link payment to performance by measuring the effectiveness of 
medicines through “Quality-Adjusted Life Year[s]” or QALYs.325 In 
general, PBR covers various types of arrangements and schemes 
under its umbrella including risk sharing schemes and patient access 
schemes.326 Some of these schemes may reward good results by 
giving a bonus for instance, or simply penalize failure to achieve the 
agreed goals and objectives or cost savings in accordance with an 
identified metric for assessing drug’s health impact and monitoring 
improvement.327 
Accordingly, “payment schemes are therefore used in an attempt 
to influence the achievement of objectives such as quality, efficiency 
 
 322.  See James, supra note 321, at 1-2 (outlining mixed results of pay-for-
performance programs under the Affordable Care Act).  
 323.  Gregory C. Pope, Overview of Pay for Performance Models and Issues, in 
PAY FOR PERFORMANCE IN HEALTH CARE: METHODS AND APPROACHES 33, 33 
(Jerry Cromwell et al. eds., 2011) (providing a detailed overview of the elements 
and implementation of pay-for-performance programs).   
 324.  Carl Nathan, Aligning Pharmaceutical Innovation with Medical Need, 13 
NATURE MED. 304, 307 (2007). 
 325.  See AIDAN HOLLIS & THOMAS POGGE, THE HEALTH IMPACT FUND: 
MAKING NEW MEDICINES ACCESSIBLE FOR ALL 9 (2008) (explaining that “[a] drug 
that extends a person’s life by ten healthy years would be credited with ten 
QALYs” and describing the way that QALYs are assessed). 
 326.  See Louis P. Garrison, Jr. et al., Performance-Based Risk-Sharing 
Arrangements—Good Practices for Design, Implementation, and Evaluation: 
Report of the ISPOR Good Practices for Performance-Based Risk-Sharing 
Arrangements Task Force, 16 VALUE IN HEALTH 703, 704 (2013). 
 327.  See 4 SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, SIDLEY GLOBAL PRICING NEWSLETTER 1-2 
(2016) (describing an Australian reward-based scheme that determines the price 
the government pays the drug manufacturer based on the benefit of the drug to 
each individual patient); James, supra note 321 (providing an example of a penalty 
used by Medicare, which no longer pays for preventable conditions, such as 
urinary tract infections associated with catheter use, that develop during a hospital 
stay).   
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and cost control.”328 There have been a number of pay-for-
performance schemes already adopted by a number of developed 
countries including the United Kingdom and the United States.329 For 
instance, in the United Kingdom, before 2003, hospitals were mainly 
paid using a system of annual block contracts, with an agreed sum of 
money for a given amount of activity.330 This changed in 2004, 
where a new scheme was based “on practices rather than individual 
GPs, and was funded out of a fixed national global sum for primary 
medical care. It incorporated a voluntary pay-for-performance 
component.”331 The UK’s General Medical Services Contract, for 
example, rewards performance in accordance with a criteria based on 
146 performance measures.332 More specifically designated schemes 
are also gaining ground. More recently, the NHS in Scotland 
announced a new scheme late 2014, whereby it could be reimbursed 
for the cost of a new hepatitis drug if sufferers fail to clear the 
virus.333 It was reported that the Scottish Medicines Consortium 
(“SMC”) has approved the drug, whose generic name is Simeprevir, 
for use within NHS Scotland.334 The “Pay If You Clear” scheme is 
awaiting a formal decision by NHS Scotland.335 
There are also a number of similar schemes currently in place in 
the United States which even preceded those in the United 
 
 328.  LOUISE MARSHALL ET AL., NUFFIELDTRUST, THE NHS PAYMENT SYSTEM: 
EVOLVING POLICY AND EMERGING EVIDENCE 6 (2014). 
 329.  See, e.g., Aaron E. Carroll, The Problem with ‘Pay for Performance’ in 
Medicine, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/ 
upshot/the-problem-with-pay-for-performance-in-medicine.html. 
 330.  See MARSHALL ET AL., supra note 328, at 3, 7 (explaining the benefits and 
drawbacks of block budgets and the United Kingdom’s decision to move away 
from them).  
 331.  Id. at 14. 
 332.  See Pope, supra note 323, at 41 (noting that the focus on physicians’ 
performance is important because they control most health care spending when 
determining whether or not to authorize care).  
 333.  Reevel Alderson, Unique “Pay if you Clear” Proposal for New Hepatitis 
Drug, BBC NEWS (Oct. 13, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-
29569242 (“The ‘Pay If You Clear’ scheme would come into effect if patients 
treated with the drug do not become free of the hepatitis C virus (HCV) after 12 
weeks.”). 
 334.  See id. 
 335.  Id. (“The novel proposal was revealed after the drug Olysio was cleared 
for use by the SMC.”). 
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Kingdom.336 James identified more than forty private sector schemes 
which were already in place in 2012.337 She states that “[p]ay-for-
performance has become popular among policy makers and private 
and public payers, including Medicare and Medicaid.”338 The largest 
of these schemes in the United States is the Premier Hospital Quality 
Incentive Demonstration project.339 “From 2003 to 2009, CMS and 
Premier, a nationwide hospital system, tested the extent to which 
financial bonuses would improve the quality of care provided to 
Medicare patients with certain conditions, including acute 
myocardial infarction, heart failure, and pneumonia.”340 James  
reports that “[t]he American Medical Association has developed 
principles for pay-for-performance programs emphasizing that 
provider participation should be voluntary; that physicians should be 
allowed to review, comment, and appeal performance data; and that 
programs should use new funding ‘for what’s next?’”.341 Pay-for-
performance programs are likely to expand across U.S. health care in 
the near future, especially with implementation of the Affordable 
Care Act. More countries are also showing interest in such 
schemes.342 
IX. EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT 
There is an agreement that the patent related challenges described 
earlier in this article will not disappear over a night nor will the 
current patent protection regime be able to steer innovation towards 
solving the global health challenges. In fact, attempts to reform the 
system have failed so far in bearing fruit. Having said that, many 
patients’ lives in many parts of the world that do not have access to 
 
 336.  See Marin Gemmill, Pay-for-Performance in the US: What Lessons for 
Europe?, 13 EUROHEALTH, no. 4, 2007, at 21, 21-23 (2007) (adding that the 
United Kingdom was the first out of all the European countries to use a pay-for-
performance system).  
 337.  James, supra note 321, at 2. 
 338.  Id. at 1. 
 339.  Id. at 2. 
 340.  Id.  
 341.  Id. at 5. 
 342.  See, e.g., GILBERT’S LLP, TOWARD PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE: 
REIMBURSEMENT OF INNOVATIVE NEW DRUGS 1 (2012) (arguing that there is a 
renewed interest conditional reimbursement schemes by pointing to more recent 
programs in Belgium and the Netherlands). 
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medicines are being lost.343 Taking a pragmatic approach through 
exploring available options which at the same time do not conflict 
with the current patent system is badly needed. 
In line with this, HIP enters the picture as a PBR scheme which 
does not conflict with the intellectual property system but rather 
coexist with its deficiencies.344 It offers producers an incentive to be 
rewarded (through payment of a fixed amount of money each year, 
divided among the registered medicines according to their respective 
health impact) from public funds in addition to sales over a period of 
time in proportion to the impact of their invention on health impact 
or the global burden of disease against making the invention 
available to others345 by giving pharmaceutical companies the option 
of registering any new medicine, thereby agreeing to provide it at 
cost anywhere it is needed.346 
So if the problem is due to market size and purchasing powers for 
the treatment of a neglected disease, HIP indirectly channels efforts 
to deal with that by offering a reward, or say an early cashing in 
mechanism. The HIP, however, does not focus on neglected diseases 
only nor on developing countries, it rather creates a framework 
which works globally and for other types of diseases including 
communicable ones.347 
 
 343.  See BAILEY ET AL., supra note 53, at 3 (disputing industrialized country 
claims that patenting of medication is not a crucial health issue because it only 
affects 5% of current WHO essential drugs by pointing out that it includes vital 
and prohibitively expensive drugs such as anti-HIV/AIDS medicine); Sigrid 
Sterckx, Patents and Access to Drugs in Developing Countries: An Ethical 
Analysis, 4 DEV. WORLD BIOETHICS 58, 66 (2004) (arguing that rethinking the 
global patent regime is essential to providing a third of the world’s population 
access to essential drugs that they currently lack).  
 344.  HOLLIS & POGGE, supra note 325, at 16. 
 345.  See David Coles & Lynn J. Frewer, Stakeholder Views Regarding the 
Objectives and Implementation of the HIF, in THE LIVING TREE, TRADITIONAL 
MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN CHINA AND INDIA, supra note 35, at 51, 51; see 
also Karan & Pogge, supra note 32, at 2 (noting that the HIF would have the 
highest impact for products with a potential high global health impact but low 
expected profit under the patent system).  
 346.  See Karan & Pogge, supra note 32, at 3. 
 347.  See HOLLIS & POGGE, supra note 325, at 8 (arguing that, even though in 
the short term the HIP will primarily introduce new medicine for diseases that 
primarily affect the poor, in the medium term it will attract “high impact medicines 
for global diseases and conditions” that affect both the rich and the poor). 
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Pay-for-performance schemes are increasingly becoming an 
integral tool of national public health frameworks. Although there 
are various studies indicating the positive impact such schemes have 
in improving the accessibility and availability of medicines, the 
reality is that one of the biggest challenges facing these schemes is 
the fact that they remain somehow disconnected and absent from the 
majority of national public health strategies.348 
In general, actual measurement of these schemes would vary and 
engulf a number of indicators depending on the type of the scheme in 
question thus raising one of the major challenges facing these 
schemes. Defining “performance” itself and tying payments to 
absolute or relative levels provides another challenge. In addition, 
which aspects of performance and targets should be use as indicators 
and benchmarks of achieving the objectives? Indeed, as proclaimed, 
“[r]ewarding performance first requires the ability to measure it.”349 
There are a number of additional challenges which face PBRs and 
HIP today. To start with, they require political support and long term 
commitment from national authorities which is often lacking. On the 
technical side of things, they require the existence of an accurate 
assessment tool of impact of certain medicines on disease treatment 
and improvement.350 The lack of institutionalization and adequate 
legal regime of these schemes also adds another layer of difficulty 
since these remain largely optional rather than compulsory. 
The issue of perception also needs further clarity. Emerging 
evidence is supportive of the view that these schemes often result in 
positive outcome. A 2006 review by Petersen et al. found most 
studies indicating partial or positive effects of performance for pay 
financial incentives on quality measures.351 Some studies, however, 
 
 348.  See James, supra note 321. 
 349.  MARSHALL ET AL., supra note 328, at 11. 
 350.  Currently, the standard measure of performance in health is the QALY in 
which quality adjustments are based on studies of how individuals value different 
health states. Specific QALY-based measurement tools include the EQ-5D, Paul 
Dolan, Modeling Valuations for EuroQol Health States, 35 MED. CARE 1095 
(1997), and the Health Utility Index, George W. Torrance et al., Multiattribute 
Utility Function for a Comprehensive Health Status Classification System: Health 
Utilities Index Mark 2, 34 MED. CARE 702 (1996), which have been used to help 
determine the cost per QALY to make reimbursement decisions.  
 351.  See Laura A. Petersen et al., Does Pay-for-Performance Improve the 
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indicate that not all PBRs have had a positive impact.352 A 2012 
study published by The New England Journal of Medicine353 found 
that thirty-day mortality, or the rate at which people died within a 
month after receiving certain procedures or care, was similar at the 
start of the study between the two groups, and that the decline in 
mortality over the next six years was also similar.354 “Moreover, they 
found that even among the conditions that were explicitly linked to 
incentives, like heart attacks and coronary artery bypass grafts, pay-
for-performance resulted in no improvements compared with 
conditions without financial incentives.”355 
Finally, lack of funding remains a huge challenge. It was estimated 
for instance that HIP would need to mobilize $6 billion per year to 
cater for its objectives.356 This includes the support for the 
development of about two new drugs per year in addition to 
sustaining a stock of about twenty medicines.357 
X. THE WAY FORWARD 
In the light of the above and in order to create and establish a 
legally and ethically sound PBRs scheme, more research, 
assessment, and examination is needed. More specifically, HIP needs 
to create a new measurement tool which is suitable for various 
countries and at the same time avoids the pitfalls of the current 
regime.358 
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The legal regime for initiatives like HIP and pay-for-performance 
schemes should be reviewed in the light of these initiatives as it is 
vital to position such schemes accordingly. More specifically, the 
relationship between intellectual property and PBRs is also under 
scrutiny. Intellectual property protection’s main focus is the 
protection of property rights while PBRs’ main concern is public 
health and access to medicines.359 
Despite the above, the inherent deficiencies of the intellectual 
property regime in this area need addressing to bring it in line with 
such schemes. Although the TRIPS Agreement sets minimum 
standards for patent protection for all member states, it neglects the 
fact that patent protection for medicines is just one element of many 
that contributes to setting the prices of medicines in any country 
(procurement, taxes, production ability, and public health insurance 
schemes are among other factors). By requiring such a monopoly 
term under national law, however, it places the issue of patent 
protection as one of the main determinants of the prices of medicines 
thus neglecting other factors.360 Governments and individuals alike 
will bear the costs, although the citizens of developing countries are 
more likely to suffer more due to the lack of proper and adequate 
public health coverage and insurance systems in these countries.361 
So while reaching an understanding at the international level is 
needed at some point,362 initiatives at the national and regional levels 
should also be undertaken. In fact, some countries have already 
started experimenting with some sort of regimes/funds under their 
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intellectual property regimes. For instance, under the 2002 Egypt 
Intellectual Property Law,363 a drug price fund is proposed to deal 
with high process of medicines. Based on this, article 18 of the law 
states: 
A Drug Price Stability Fund, having a legal entity and reporting to the 
Minister of Health and Population, shall be established to maintain 
stability in the prices of drugs -other than export drugs -with a view to 
achieve health development and to guarantee that drug prices are not 
affected by incidental changes. The organisation and resources of the fund 
shall be determined by a decree to be issued by the President of the 
Republic. Such resources shall include contributions from donor states 
and intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations, as agreed by 
the State.364 
The preceding discussion paves the way to identify the real 
problem with today’s model for financing medicines. Based on this, 
HIP and PBRs provide complementary tools which may assist in 
filling the gap by seeking to “reimburse drug companies that provide 
an innovative drug at its cost price, with a reward based on the drug’s 
incremental performance in improving health outcomes.”365 This is 
done by “measuring a drug’s health impact in comparison with pre-
existing treatments, with a reward payable based on the drug’s 
incremental benefit.”366 More importantly, HIP would trigger the 
incentive—the reward—for the development of drugs affecting the 
poor where little R&D activities are undertaken. By doing so, the 
HIP balances profits and accessibility. Developing countries may 
find useful tools in such schemes. 
XI. CONCLUSION 
This article considered various developments related to the 
international intellectual property regime impacting access to 
medicines and public health. Developing countries should adapt a 
proactive approach in interpreting intellectual property obligations 
under their national law. Special attention is given to those 
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developing countries committed due to various bilateral and regional 
agreements to apply TRIPS-Plus rules the paper provides various 
examples from both developed and developing countries where 
countries managed to limit the impact of TRIPS-Plus rules on their 
citizens. 
The paper also calls upon countries to also look for supplementary 
tools to the intellectual property regime which would assist them in 
dealing with public health challenges.367 In accordance with this, the 
paper places the discussion on pay-for-performance schemes as an 
integral part of an overall national development and health policy-
making which is main objective is the enhancement of innovation in 
public health, accessibility, and availability of medicines.368 
If the above objectives are to be achieved, then the starting point 
would be to acknowledge that the current national and global models 
of financing and promoting medicines innovations are not working 
and that a new thinking should be adopted. Continuing with the 
current models will only exasperate the problem rather than solving 
it. 
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